Nash equilibria in the two-player kidney exchange game

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• 作者：Margarida Carvalho ; Andrea Lodi ; João Pedro Pedroso ; Ana Viana
• 关键词：Kidney exchange ; Nash equilibrium ; Social welfare ; Matching
• 刊名：Mathematical Programming
• 出版年：2017
• 出版时间：January 2017
• 年：2017
• 卷：161
• 期：1-2
• 页码：389-417
• 全文大小：
• 刊物类别：Mathematics and Statistics
• 刊物主题：Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control; Optimization; Mathematics of Computing; Numerical Analysis; Combinatorics; Theoretical, Mathematical and Computational Physics; Mathematical Methods in Phys
• 出版者：Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• ISSN：1436-4646
• 卷排序：161

文摘

Kidney exchange programs have been set in several countries within national, regional or hospital frameworks, to increase the possibility of kidney patients being transplanted. For the case of hospital programs, it has been claimed that hospitals would benefit if they collaborated with each other, sharing their internal pools and allowing transplants involving patients of different hospitals. This claim led to the study of multi-hospital exchange markets. We propose a novel direction in this setting by modeling the exchange market as an integer programming game. The analysis of the strategic behavior of the entities participating in the kidney exchange game allowed us to prove that the most rational game outcome maximizes the social welfare and that it can be computed in polynomial time.