Independence and accountability of independent regulatory agencies: the case of Turkey

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• 作者：Tamer Çetin ; M. Zahid Sobacı…
• 刊名：European Journal of Law and Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：June 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：41
• 期：3
• 页码：601-620
• 全文大小：481 KB
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Law and Economics
  European Integration
  Public Finance and Economics
  Commercial Law
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-9990
• 卷排序：41

文摘

For a long time, governments have delegated their regulatory powers to independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). The aim is to reduce transaction costs and to ensure a credible commitment in the regulatory institutional structure. This paper discusses transition to IRAs in Turkey in terms of independence and accountability. To this aim, we firstly analyze the institutional foundations of transition to IRAs in Turkey from a political economy perspective and then measure their formal independence levels. We find that the pragmatic policies of the incumbent government regarding IRAs negatively influence their independence. This injures the credibility of regulatory commitment and increases the political transaction costs of regulatory process in Turkey.KeywordsRegulatory agenciesTransaction costsCredible commitmentIndependenceAccountability