The economic value of military connections in Turkey

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• 作者：G?k?e G?ktepe (2)
  Shanker Satyanath (1)
  
• 关键词：Democratic transitions ; Democracy ; Political development ; Political economy ; N45
• 刊名：Public Choice
• 出版年：2013
• 出版时间：4 - June 2013
• 年：2013
• 卷：155
• 期：3
• 页码：531-552
• 全文大小：605KB
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• 作者单位：G?k?e G?ktepe (2)
  Shanker Satyanath (1)
  
  2. Research Division, Standard Bank-Istanbul, Ahi Evran Caddesi, Polaris Plaza 1/1 Maslak, 34938, Istanbul, Turkey
  1. Department of Politics, New York University, 19 West Fourth Street, New York, NY, 10012, USA
  
• ISSN：1573-7101

文摘

Can financial connections to the military provide economic value in democratic environments? We address this question by studying whether firms in which the Turkish military had a controlling financial interest earned abnormally high stock returns on the Istanbul stock exchange. Our findings from event studies are that this is indeed the case. We infer that militaries can retain substantial power to influence economic policy from behind the scenes even after formally transferring it to democratically elected leaders. The paper contributes to the literature in public choice by demonstrating econometrically that the military can be a major rent seeking actor even in democratic environments.