Inside post-socialist courts: the determinants of adjudicatory outcomes in Slovenian commercial disputes

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• 作者：Peter Grajzl ; Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl…
• 关键词：Courts ; Post ; socialist countries ; Commercial disputes ; Trial ; Settlement ; K40 ; K41 ; P37 ; D02
• 刊名：European Journal of Law and Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：February 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：41
• 期：1
• 页码：85-115
• 全文大小：588 KB
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• 作者单位：Peter Grajzl (1) (2)
  Valentina Dimitrova-Grajzl (3)
  Katarina Zajc (4)
  
  1. Department of Economics, The Williams School, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA, 24450, USA
  2. CESifo, Munich, Germany
  3. Department of Economics and Business, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA, 24450, USA
  4. Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, 1000, Ljubljana, Slovenia
  
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Law and Economics
  European Integration
  Public Finance and Economics
  Commercial Law
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-9990

文摘

Despite the judiciary’s central role in the capitalist market system, micro-level empirical analyses of courts in post-socialist countries are remarkably rare. This paper draws on a unique hand-collected dataset of commercial claims filed at Slovenian courts to examine the determinants of two salient adjudicatory outcomes: whether a case was resolved via trial or settlement and if the case was tried, whether the plaintiff was awarded the initial claim. Consistent with the divergent expectations theories of litigation, we find that trial-based resolution is less likely when parties use mediation and more likely when the case is complex as proxied by appointment of an expert. In contrast, stakes do not predict the prospects of trial. Addressing sample selection concerns, we show that defendants’ legal representation, plaintiffs’ profitability, and court identity are robust predictors of plaintiff victory at trial. We discuss possible explanations for these data patterns. Keywords Courts Post-socialist countries Commercial disputes Trial Settlement