Identifying the determinants of aggregate judicial performance: taxpayers' money well spent?

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• 作者：Stefan Voigt ; Nora El-Bialy
• 关键词：Judicial efficiency ; Judicial performance ; Judicial productivity ; Court budget ; Number of resolved cases ; Judicial councils
• 刊名：European Journal of Law and Economics
• 出版年：2016
• 出版时间：April 2016
• 年：2016
• 卷：41
• 期：2
• 页码：283-319
• 全文大小：1,270 KB
• 参考文献：Bagues, M., & Esteve-Volart, B. (2010). Performance pay and judicial production: Evidence from Spain. Typescript.
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• 作者单位：Stefan Voigt (1)
  Nora El-Bialy (1)
  
  1. Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg, Johnsallee 35, 20148, Hamburg, Germany
  
• 刊物类别：Business and Economics
• 刊物主题：Economics
  Law and Economics
  European Integration
  Public Finance and Economics
  Commercial Law
  
• 出版者：Springer Netherlands
• ISSN：1572-9990

文摘

There have been a sizeable number of studies trying to identify the determinants of judicial performance on the country level. Such a design is appropriate to identify underperforming individual judges or underperforming courts or court districts. However, it is not appropriate to identify institutions conducive to judicial performance. A dataset produced by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice contains very detailed information on the judicial systems of the 47 member countries of the Council of Europe. Drawing on robust regressions and using an objective variable, we find that (1) resolution rates are not a function of per capita income. In other words: poor countries can also afford them. (2) Countries belonging to the French legal tradition enjoy relatively lower resolution rates. (3) Resolution rates are negatively—and very robustly—correlated with court budget. As such, a higher budget will not “buy” more court decisions. (4) Resolution rates are never positively correlated with the presence of judicial councils. (5) Mandatory training for judges is correlated with higher resolution rates. Drawing on the subjectively perceived efficiency of the judiciary as the dependent variable we find that (6) countries belonging to both the French and the socialist legal tradition are less efficient and that (7) judicial councils are also negatively correlated with our measure of judicial efficiency, in other words: countries that do not have them should not introduce them.