Flourishing bodies: Disability,virtue,happiness.

详细信息   

• 作者：Purcell ; Elizabeth B.
• 学历：Ph.D.
• 年：2013
• 导师：Kearney, Richard,eadvisorMcCoy, Marinaecommittee memberByrne, Patrickecommittee member
• 毕业院校：Boston College
• Department：GSAS - Philosophy
• ISBN：9781267960122
• CBH：3554988
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：1276041
• Pages：230

文摘

The principal aim of this dissertation is to develop and defend an account of Aristotelian virtue ethics which is grounded in empirical psychology and enables people with disabilities to flourish as moral exemplars within a society. I begin my defense of Aristotelian virtue ethics by developing the following account of empirical virtue based on a narrative identity which desires and actively pursues the good in life-long striving. This moral desire is encouraged through the shared dialogue of virtuous caregiving, which enables a moral novice to flourish and grow into a moral expert. This pursuit of the good enables everyone to flourish and incorporates insights from disability, embodied cognition and social psychology. To accomplish this task, I begin with an examination of the first of two foundational components of character, i.e., the four processing levels of CAPS theory in Chapter Two: Moral Perception. Although CAPS theory provides a solid beginning for an account of virtue, it is not a sustainable theory throughout life. This theory of social-cognitive moral psychology needs to be supplemented by developmental moral psychology. CAPS theory also assumes the individuals perspective in the dynamic interaction between situation and character. It assumes a persons intentions, and this assumption of intentionality&mdash；desires, intentions, and beliefs&mdash；assumes a persons embodiment in that situation. In other words, CAPS theory assumes lived embodiment. In this chapter, I turn to the method of phenomenology used by both psychologists and philosophers of embodied cognition to account for the moral "interpretation of the situation" experienced by people with illness or impairment. As a complimentary to CAPS and the second foundational component for character, certain moral psychologists have argued for the narrative development of Event Representations for virtuous character. This development begins with the shared dialogue of the caregiver and dependent asking the dependent to recall events which have just occurred. In this practice, the caregivers aim is to help the dependent form memories and incorporate those memories into the creation of a narrative identity. In Chapter Three: Representations of Moral Events, I extend the caring relation to this practice of shared dialogue to incorporate certain forms of intellectual disability, such as "Autism" and Alzheimers disease. I incorporate the roles of narrative and trust in order to construct the relation of dependency and interdependency as trusting co-authorship rather than reciprocal capability. After establishing the importance of the caregiver in the development of ones narrative identity, I employ the life narrative longitudinal psychological approach to moral development as a structure for the moral event representations and schemas guided by the caregiver. Finally, I argue that the co-authorship of ones life story animates ones moral desire for the good and as a result, leads to the development of interdependent virtues.. In Chapter Four: Moral Self-Coherence through Personal Strivings, I examine the importance of personal strivings for a sense of lived self-coherence for character over time. My argument is that our personal strivings are unified by the life story which animates and directs those strivings throughout our lives. Although our personal strivings may be altered or deterred due to life transitions including accident, illness, and "disabling injury," they still retain a sense of unity through our overarching life story. It is this narrative which gives unity to both our psychological intentions and bodily intentions, even when they are experienced as a phenomenally lived dualism due to illness, stroke, or impairment. In Chapter Five: Flourishing Bodies, I develop an empirically grounded model of a virtuous character which begins with interdependent virtues and eventually grows into independent virtues. To do this, I draw on the two foundational components of character: CAPS theory and event representations. From the caring relation and shared dialogue of the caregiver, an individual begins to develop basic moral schemas, tasks, and scripts. This is when the individual is a moral novice. As the novice pursues excellences in these practices, the novice grows into a moral expert according to those virtues and becomes virtuously independent. The moral expert, unlike the moral novice, executes virtuous action with ease. Having acquired skills of virtue and knowledge, the moral expert knows the right thing to do at the right time and does so with the right reasons. MacIntyre, however, acknowledged the limit of ethics and turned to politics to address specific needs for people with disabilities such as care, financial support, educational support, and political proxy. The purpose of the final chapter, The Virtue-Oriented Politics of Interdependence, is to follow MacIntyres endeavor and to propose a virtue-oriented politics of interdependence as an initial solution. In conclusion of my dissertation, The Fragility of Virtue, I provide a perspective of our human condition that is a vulnerable one. Abstract shortened by UMI.).