CEO after-tax compensation incentives and corporate tax avoidance.

详细信息   

• 作者：Gaertner ; Fabio B.
• 学历：Ph.D.
• 年：2011
• 导师：Dhaliwal, Dan S.,eadvisorEldenburg, Leslie G.ecommittee memberBens, Daniel A.ecommittee memberCook, Kirsten A.ecommittee member
• 毕业院校：University of Arizona
• Department：Accounting
• ISBN：9781124633626
• CBH：3454322
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：534368
• Pages：78

文摘

I examine the association between CEOs' after-tax incentives and their firms' levels of tax avoidance. Economic theory holds that firms should compensate CEOs on an after-tax basis when the expected tax savings generated from incentive alignment outweigh the incremental compensation demanded by CEOs for bearing additional tax-related compensation risk. Using publicly available data, I estimate CEOs' after-tax incentives and find a negative relation between the use of after-tax incentives and effective tax rates. While the results suggest that greater use of after-tax measures in CEO compensation leads to higher tax savings, it is possible that these savings will lead to lower pre-tax returns, or implicit taxes. Therefore, I also examine the association between the use of after-tax incentives and implicit taxes and find a positive association between the two. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between after-tax incentives and total CEO compensation, suggesting that CEOs who are compensated after-tax demand a premium for the additional risk they bear.