Two essays on managing innovation.

详细信息   

• 作者：Ielceanu ; Elena Daniela.
• 学历：Doctor
• 年：2003
• 导师：Biglaiser, Gary
• 毕业院校：The University of North Carolina
• 专业：Business Administration, Management.;Economics, Commerce-Business.;Economics, Theory.
• ISBN：9780496595600
• CBH：3112030
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：2810550
• Pages：96

文摘

The dissertation consists of two chapters. In "Voluntary Disclosure Prior to Sale" I investigate how innovative firms with limited access to the capital market compete to sell their ideas in an environment characterized by weak or absent property rights protection. To inform potential buyers about the value of an idea, sellers need to disclose some information prior to an anticipated sale, exposing themselves to expropriation: the information revealed cannot be protected and sellers may obtain payment only for the portion that was withheld. I show that the buyer's beliefs about the extent of pre-sale disclosure are essential for the equilibrium amount of disclosure. The buyer can assume skeptical beliefs and interpret the information reported as full revelation. Such beliefs sustain the existence of pooling equilibria with no disclosure and positive profits for the seller, and a full disclosure equilibrium with zero profits for the seller. If the buyer has less skeptical beliefs, then there is another class of equilibria. The equilibrium that I focus on is the best partition equilibrium from the seller's point of view, where low information sellers fully disclose and obtain zero payoffs, while high information sellers disclose partially and obtain positive payoffs.;I also show that the existence of complementarities between sellers' ideas improves on the sellers' expected payoffs but lowers the buyer's expected payoffs. In the second chapter, "Innovation Incentives for Diversified Regulated Monopolies" I investigate the incentives of a regulated monopoly to engage in cost reducing effort when it is allowed to diversify into a competitive market. The firm may use its position in the regulated market to cross subsidize its competitive operations. This creates a potential trade-off for a regulator of allowing an efficient firm into a market versus implicitly subsidizing the entry through pricing in the regulated market. Using simple functional forms, I show that diversification and cost-reducing innovation opens the door for inefficient behavior on the part of the regulated firm. The firm engages in inefficient cost reducing innovation in each market, but it does not deter entry in the competitive market.