Essays in Microeconomic Theory.
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文摘
My thesis consists of three separate chapters. In the first chapter,we introduce a new institutional framework for implementation written in a language closer to the institutional real life mechanisms. Implementation of socially acceptable alternatives,described by a social choice rule,can be thought of as a design of power distribution in the society whose "equilibrium outcomes" coincide with the alternatives chosen by the social choice rule at each preference profile of the society. The notion of a "rights structure" introduced by Sertel ? fits our approach best to formalize the power distribution in the society. We formulate and characterize implementability via rights structures under different specifications. We also identify how implementation via rights structures is related to Nash implementation via mechanisms. In the presence of at least three agents,we find the class of rights structures,implementability via which is equivalent to Nash implementability. In the second chapter,we analyze a boundedly rational choice procedure. A choice function is list rational(izable),if there exists a fixed list and a fixed binary relation such that for each choice set,successive comparison of the alternatives according to the binary relation by following the list,retrieves the chosen alternative. List rational choice offers an intuition for how DMs (1) exhibiting binary choice cycles or (2) constraint with limited memory,makes choices from larger sets. We provide an axiomatic characterization of list rational choice functions. We also extend our analysis to random choice setup. First,we introduce stochastic path independence (SPI) condition and show that acyclicity in the violations of SPI characterizes list rational random choice functions. We further analyze the random choice functions characterized by SPI. In the last chapter,we study stochastic dominance efficiency (sd-efficiency) and ex post stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems. We characterize sd-efficient allocations in terms of a property of an order relation defined on the set of man-woman pairs. Using this property,we constructively prove that each sd-efficient probabilistic assignment maximizes the sum of expected utilities for a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences. As a corollary,we obtain the welfare Theorem by McLennan ? for the problem of allocating objects. Moreover,for each utility profile,we define a transferable utility game (TU-game) associated with it. We show that for each ex-post stable probabilistic assignment,there is a utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences such that the assignment belongs to the core of the TU-game associated with the utility profile.