Incentive-centered design of money-free mechanisms.
详细信息
- 作者：Gkatzelis ; Vasileios.
- 学历：Doctor
- 年：2013
- 毕业院校：New York University
- Department：Computer Science.
- ISBN：9781303558931
- CBH：3602659
- Country：USA
- 语种：English
- FileSize：1183777
- Pages：146
文摘
This thesis serves as a step toward a better understanding of how to design fair and efficient multiagent resource allocation systems by bringing the incentives of the participating agents to the center of the design process. As the quality of these systems critically depends on the ways in which the participants interact with each other and with the system,an ill-designed set of incentives can lead to severe inefficiencies. The special focus of this work is on the problems that arise when the use of monetary exchanges between the system and the participants is prohibited. This is a common restriction that substantially complicates the designer's task； we nevertheless provide a sequence of positive results in the form of mechanisms that maximize efficiency or fairness despite the possibly self-interested behavior of the participating agents. The first part of this work is a contribution to the literature on approximate mechanism design without money. Given a set of divisible resources,our goal is to design a mechanism that allocates them among the agents. The main complication here is due to the fact that the agents' preferences over different allocations may not be known to the system. Therefore,the mechanism needs to be designed in such a way that it is in the best interest of every agent to report the truth about her preferences； since monetary rewards and penalties cannot be used in order to elicit the truth,a much more delicate regulation of the resource allocation is necessary. The second part of this work concerns the design of money-free resource allocation mechanisms for decentralized multiagent systems. As the world has become increasingly interconnected,such systems are using more and more resources that are geographically dispersed； to provide scalability in these systems,the mechanisms need to be decentralized. That is,the allocation decisions for any given resource should not assume global information regarding the system's resources or participants. We approach this restriction by using coordination mechanisms: simple resource allocation policies,each of which controls only one of the resources and uses only local information regarding the state of the system.