文摘
This dissertation consists of four essays that study normative questions on issues related to financial markets and the macroeconomy. The first essay characterizes the optimal linear financial transaction tax in an equilibrium model of competitive financial markets. As long as investors hold distorted beliefs about the returns of assets in fixed supply,it shows that the optimal tax must be positive,even when there exist fundamental motives for trading. It studies dynamic environments and allows for production and information diffusion. The second essay characterizes the optimal bankruptcy exemption for risk averse borrowers who use arbitrary unsecured contracts but can default. It provides a novel general formula for the optimal exemption as a function of a few observable sufficient statistics. The third essay studies fire sales externalities in Walrasian models with incomplete markets and/or credit collateral) constraints. It identifies two distinct externalities: terms-of-trade and collateral externalities. It also shows that corrective government interventions may be time inconsistent and that the welfare implications of fire sales must be decoupled from amplification mechanisms. The fourth essay models the strategic interaction between banks and the government when bailouts are possible. It analyzes how imperfect common knowledge about the governments bailout policy affects the ex-ante leverage choice for each bank. It shows that the probability of bailout and the economy-wide leverage is larger when large banks are present.