Essays in Economics.

详细信息   

• 作者：Mermelstein ; Benjamin.
• 学历：Doctor
• 年：2015
• 毕业院校：Northwestern University
• Department：Economics.
• ISBN：9781321634259
• CBH：3686618
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：2062029
• Pages：163

文摘

These essays examine individual behavior in the context of existing behavioral game theory models as well as extend existing economic models to explain individual and firm behavior more realistically. Chapter 1 develops a model of choice with endogenous frames with the endogeneity motivated by evolutionary psychology. In the chapter I define an endogenous framing representation and show that one exists for any observed set of menus,beliefs over menus,and choices. I go on to examine the necessary and sufficient conditions for an endogenous framing representation with a limited set of frames. Chapter 2 examines data collected from a dynamic game played online for real money called Tactic War. In an effort to extend the results of experimental game theory to more complicated games and interactions in which individuals frequently compete,the chapter diverges from most experimental game theory literature both by studying a complicated game and one that is played outside of the laboratory. I describe the procedure used to find the Nash equilibrium and compare the data to Nash equilibrium as well as existing behavioral game theory models. I find two major themes in the data. First,players strategy selection is impacted by the salience of the strategies and the objectives they satisfy. Second,players spend their mental energy on trying to predict what their opponents will do rather than being unpredictable themselves. Chapter 3 studies optimal merger policy in a dynamic model in which the presence of scale economies implies that firms can reduce costs through either internal investment in building capital or through mergers. The model allows firms to invest or propose mergers according to the relative profitability of these strategies. We find that optimal policy in this dynamic setting can differ substantially from what would be best considering only welfare in the period the merger is proposed. We also find that the ability of an antitrust authority to commit can lead to a significant welfare improvement. In general,antitrust policy can greatly affect firms optimal investment behavior； and firms investment behavior can in turn greatly affect the antitrust authoritys optimal policy.