文摘
The elective affinity between capitalist development and democracy is a widely held belief in the West: Will marketization in China finally lead to democracy? If so, what are the mechanisms? By scrutinizing social conditions and political practices in two regions---government-led development in Sunan and entrepreneur-initiated development in Wenzhou, this dissertation examines the political consequences of economic reform in China in the last two decades.;It first discusses how resource endowment and government capacity channeled the two regions into different development paths, which in turn shaped power relations between the people and government. Then it captures the impact of different developmental patterns upon economic equality and class structure. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, entrepreneur-initiated development in Wenzhou has created more economic equality and flat class structure due to its open opportunity structure; while government-led development in Sunan has created more inequality and polarized class structure due to the government control of opportunity at the first stage and unfair privatization later on, Finally, the dissertation examines the political configurations in each region. Not surprisingly, Wenzhou did witness vibrant grass roots democratic practices, In contrast, authoritarian corporatism still characterizes Sunan's political situation.;The key findings of this dissertation revolve around the relationship between class structure, government capacity and democracy, Though the new emerging entrepreneurial class has motives and certain capability to push for democracy, entrepreneurs pursue their interests in different ways under different class structures, Under a polarized class structure, entrepreneurs realize their interests by associating with government officials, thus resulting in elite coalition; while in an equalized class structure, competition among entrepreneurs causes contest in local politics, which led to the emergence of democracy.;Government capacity has overwhelming influences as well. My basic conclusion is that a too strong government is inimical to democracy since a strong local government has propensity to penetrate society if there is no countervailing power. And government officials are likely to strengthen their power if they meet no opposition.