The Hometown of Prefectural Officials and the Provision of Local Public Goods in Contemporary China.

详细信息   

• 作者：Wang ; Fang.
• 学历：Doctor
• 年：2012
• 导师：Li,Lianjiang,eadvisorWu,Fengshiecommittee memberLi,Lianjiangecommittee memberZhan,Jing Vivianecommittee memberCai,Yongshunecommittee member
• 毕业院校：The Chinese University of Hong Kong
• Department：Government and Public Administration.
• ISBN：9781303022128
• CBH：3538890
• Country：China
• 语种：English
• FileSize：2282167
• Pages：169

文摘

Literature on local government behavior in transitional China has primarily examined the impact of formal institutions on the motivations of officials in promoting local economic growth. In particular,investigations focused on how the existing personnel management system provides a &ldquo；yardstick competition&rdquo； among local officials and therefore guarantees the success of economic reform. Meanwhile,such formal institutions have similarly been studied for the crucial reason that local government ignores the provision of public goods. Nevertheless,even after controlling the influence of formal institutions and socio-economic factors,variations could still be observed on the level of efforts among local governments regarding the provision of public goods. However,these variations cannot be sufficiently explained by existing literature. This research,based on prefectural data in China in 1990&ndash；2010,aims to fill this gap through a systematic examination of the effects of informal institutions on local government behavior,especially the casual relationship between the hometown of officials and the provision of local public goods. This research,based on prefectural data in China in 1990&ndash；2010,aims to fill this gap by systematically examining the effects of informal institutions on local government behavior,especially the casual relationship between the hometown of officials and the provision of local public goods. This study finds that holding other variables equal,a native prefectural leader would significantly increase fiscal expenditure rates on basic education,public health,and environmental protection in his jurisdiction,compared with a leader with a different hometown. However,the increased expenditure on public goods impacts those on infrastructure construction,which tends to incur a lower expenditure rate from a local leader compared with that of an official from other prefectures. Meanwhile,using provincial data,this research determines that informal institutions influence the upper-level government,though the effects have weakened. These findings reveal that,in an environment dominated by formal institutions,informal institutions still influence the behavior of officials. In addition,to a certain extent,informal institutions could mitigate the negative effects of formal institutions on the behavior of officials. Based on empirical findings,I used two cases and several interviews with local people and officials to further investigate the mechanism of this influence from informal institutions. By analyzing the efforts of native leaders on promoting the provision of local public goods,I illustrate the mechanism on how the informal institution shapes the behavior of officials,thereby providing evidence for a casual causal relationship. I attribute such pattern to the constraints of local reputation imposed on native officials,who would be deeply embedded in local personnel networks and therefore focus on the evaluation from local people. Local reputation thus imposes additional constraints on the behavior of native officials,which serves as a kind of bottom-up accountability. By investigating the effects of informal institutions and the interaction of formal-informal institutions,this research would help deepen our understanding on the dynamics of institutions under nondemocratic regimes and enable more accurate predictions of political behavior.