文摘
What is the best explanation of China's alliances since the founding of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)? Current explanations rest on the dynamics of the strategic triangle and argue that China's alliances have been attempts to counterbalance threats to Chinese security from the primary superpower adversary of the PRC. But these arguments inadequately explain two alliance relationships: those with Democratic Kampuchea (1976--1991) and with Thailand (1979--1991). Building upon "balance of threat" theory and focusing on these two cases, this dissertation offers a better explanation of the formation, duration, and termination of China's security alliances with other states. The argument here is that China will seek alliances to counterbalance serious threats to its security whether those threats come from a regional neighbor or from a superpower. Thus, the Sino-Kampuchean and Sino-Thai alignments are best explained by viewing them as counterbalancing moves against the Vietnamese threat to Chinese security interests in mainland Southeast Asia.;This dissertation uses detailed process-tracing of the dynamics and events in the Sino-Kampuchean and Sino-Thai cases to competitively test balance of threat theory and "balancing against the primary superpower adversary" theory. After showing that balance of threat theory has greater explanatory power in these two cases, it will be used more briefly to explain China's formal and informal alliances with Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and North Vietnam in order to demonstrate its broader applicability as a general explanation of Chinese alliances. The conclusion will also draw some initial generalizations about Chinese behavior in alliances with regional neighbors.