Essays on macroeconomics.

详细信息   

• 作者：McKay ; Alisdair Graham.
• 学历：Ph.D.
• 年：2010
• 导师：Krusell, Per,eadvisor
• 毕业院校：Princeton University
• ISBN：9781109607376
• CBH：3393439
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：1573753
• Pages：195

文摘

In chapter 1, coauthored with Ricardo Reis, we systematically investigate the claim that contractions in economic activity are briefer shorter) and more violent rapid) than expansions. In the process we discover a robust new business cycle fact: contractions in employment are briefer and more violent than expansions but we cannot reject equal brevity and violence for output fluctuations. Existing business cycle models cannot fully account for this fact. We then show that a business cycle model with asymmetric adjustment costs on employment and a choice of when to scrap old technologies can account for the business cycle fact both qualitatively and quantitatively. 1 Chapter 2 is motivated by empirical studies of household financial decisions that suggest households are heterogeneous in their abilities to make sound financial choices. I develop a general equilibrium model of household saving behavior in which the quality of financial decisions is endogenously determined by the incentives to exert effort in learning about financial opportunities. The model embeds an equilibrium search setting in the asset market of a heterogeneous-agent savings model. The models predictions for asset market participation, portfolio returns and financial planning behavior are consistent with the data on average and across households. I use the model to analyze a partial privatization of the social security system. After privatization, households have larger portfolios and stronger incentives to search for assets. The increase in search effort increases the participation rate and results in a more competitive asset market. Chapter 3 considers regulation of retail financial markets in a setting similar to that of chapter 2. In a model in which consumers of financial services must pay an information cost or otherwise exert some effort to make a well-informed choice, regulations that attempt to suppress the supply of low-quality financial offers can have perverse effects as they blunt the incentives for consumers to become informed. In contrast, policies that strive to promote information seeking on the part of consumers improve the quality of offered contracts and improve welfare without the potential for these perverse effects to occur. 1A version of this work was published in the Journal of Monetary Economics. See McKay, Alisdair and Reis, Ricardo. 2008. "The brevity and violence of contractions and expansions." Journal of Monetary Economics, 554), 738-751.