Essays in auction theory

详细信息   

• 作者：Rodriguez ; Gustavo Eduardo
• 学历：Doctor
• 年：1994
• 关键词：Social sciences
• 导师：Wilson,Charles
• 毕业院校：New York University
• 专业：Economic theory
• CBH：9514415
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：6057721
• Pages：223

文摘

The common focus of the work reported in this dissertation is on providing several extensions of the existing literature on auctions to account for the implications of time,asymmetries and interdependence. Chapter I summarizes the contents and reviews the relevant literature. Chapter II studies the Nash equilibria of a static first price auction with two bidders and affiliated signals,focusing on the uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies. The argument for uniqueness includes a monotonicity result that heavily relies on the assumption of affiliation. Chapter III examines the performance of several solution concepts in the analysis of finite multistage auctions,focusing on the case of complete information and observable histories. Since most standard solution concepts fail to give simple and determinate answers for the case of sequential second price auctions,I develop the concept of "recursively undominated equilibrium". This concept selects a unique solution in the absence of externalities and nonseparability,and provides an extension of revenue equivalence to some dynamic environments. Moreover,when the corresponding payoff allocation is unique,it is stable in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens,in the case of sequential first price auction. This solution concept is applied in Chapter IV to sequential auctions of capacity among a monopolist and potential entrants,a problem with interesting consequences for the theory of entry preemption. Assuming that the entrants behave as Cournot oligopolists,this problem has a unique solution for a large class of demand functions. At this solution,either entry occurs in every stage or the monopolist preempts entry altogether,depending on the net benefit to the monopolist of complete preemption. Chapter V examines a trading procedure according to which the seller specifies a reserve price but relaxes his commitment to a given quantity. In some economic environments involving incomplete information and either selling or auctioning costs,this procedure is preferred by the seller to standard procedures which involve full commitment to a given quantity. Moreover,the sequence of prices displays a downward drift,a property consistent with some empirical evidence.