Essays on political institutions and the determination of trade policy.

详细信息   

• 作者：Hoffman ; Michael Everett.
• 学历：Doctor
• 年：2005
• 导师：Kimbrough, Kent P.
• 毕业院校：Duke University
• 专业：Economics, General.;Political Science, International Law and Relations.
• ISBN：0542210274
• CBH：3181475
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：4479339
• Pages：104

文摘

The three chapters of the dissertation explore important aspects of the process through which trade policy is determined, and how lobbyists and politicians interact across countries in different development stages and with different institutional structures.;The first chapter builds a theoretical model of political decentralization and special interest lobbying in democratic economies, and assesses the importance of the separation of powers empirically. The model demonstrates that the more branches of government that must approve legislation, known as institutional veto players, the lower tariffs are in equilibrium. This prediction finds empirical support using two alternative measures of the separation of powers, institutional veto players and presidential-congressional vs. parliamentary regimes.;The second chapter addresses the stylized fact that poor countries use tariffs to a much greater degree that rich countries. The conventional explanation of this stylized fact is the use of tariffs as a revenue instrument by poor countries. Embodied in a theoretical model, this intuition turns out to be inconsistent with (a) gradual trade liberalization as countries grow richer, and (b) the persistence of tariffs in rich countries. A model that includes both revenue motives for tariffs, as well as political ones, can explain the stylized fact that tariffs are much more common in poor nations, and yet still present in rich nations. The model can also explain the gradual pattern of trade liberalization experienced by developing economies, the transition from trade taxes to an income tax-based system, and the increase in government expenditures, as a percentage of income, as income rises.;The third chapter begins by revealing an important time inconsistency in the prevailing models of trade policy determination. This time inconsistency makes it difficult for politicians to commit to redistributive policies. In a dynamic model, the commitment problem is shown to be related to the tenure and uncertainty of political office: politicians or parties that are certain to remain in power for long periods of time will find it easier to engage in socially destructive exchanges with interest groups. Empirical evidence on the quantity of rent-seeking and redistribution in dictatorships and one-party democracies is consistent with this prediction.