Essays in Applied Microeconomics.
详细信息
- 作者：da Silveira ; Bernardo S.
- 学历：Doctor
- 年：2013
- 毕业院校：New York University
- Department：Economics.
- ISBN：9781303319198
- CBH：3591350
- Country：USA
- 语种：English
- FileSize：2477303
- Pages：186
文摘
This thesis consists of three independent studies on Applied Microeconomics. Chapter 1 investigates how sentences to be assigned at trial impact plea bargaining. The analysis is based on a variation of a bargaining model with asymmetric information due to Bebchuk 1984). I provide conditions for the non-parametric identification of the model,propose a consistent non-parametric estimator,and implement it using data on criminal cases from North Carolina. I find that the majority of cases settle for a sentence that is roughly 50 percent of the one that would be assigned in the event of a trial conviction. Employing the estimated model,I evaluate how different sentencing reforms affect the outcome of criminal cases. Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of TV campaign advertising on election outcomes. I explore two unique features of Brazilian gubernatorial elections: First,TV campaign advertising time is not allocated on a market-basis,but distributed free of charge among the candidates. Second,elections take place in a two-round system. In round one,candidates TV time shares are determined by their coalitions weight in the National Parliament. In round two,TV time is split equally between the first-round winner and runner-up. Using differences between rounds as a source of variation,I am able to avoid the endogeneity problems that traditionally arise in this kind of analysis. My results point to a large causal effect of TV advertising on election outcomes. Chapter 3 analyzes how the decisions taken by elected officials respond to changes in the preferences of voters. Until 1996,Superior Court judges in North Carolina used to be selected in state-wide elections. From that year on,judicial elections became district-wide. These transitions lead to a large shock in the preferences of the judges electorate. I find that judges from liberal districts became more lenient than before,while those from moderately conservative districts started assigning harsher sentences. Interestingly,judges from very conservative districts did not change their sentencing patterns. I interpret these findings as evidence that elected judges may adapt their sentencing behavior to woe the electorate,as long as voters preferences are not too different from their own.