Relationship between Chief Executive Officer Compensation and Firm Performance for U.S. Health Insurance Companies.
详细信息   
  • 作者:Moore ; Gregory A.
  • 学历:D.B.A.
  • 年:2014
  • 毕业院校:Walden University
  • Department:Applied Management and Decision Sciences
  • ISBN:9781303852350
  • CBH:3617632
  • Country:USA
  • 语种:English
  • FileSize:702730
  • Pages:93
文摘
Boards of directors have limited knowledge of the relationship between a firm's financial performance and chief executive officer's (CEO) incentive compensation within the U.S. health insurance industry. Understanding the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation will assist compensation committees with aligning a CEO's compensation with the performance of his or her firm. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between the total compensation of health insurance CEOs and the performance of their firm within the United States. Informed by agency theory,the research question focused on the relationship between firms' return on equity,annual revenue,and CEOs' total compensation,while controlling for size of firm,age of CEO,and CEO tenure. Archival databases from Standard and Poor's Compustat and ExecuComp were used,and the sample included 117 total CEO years for the years 2006 - 2012. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to identify a statistically significant predictive model,F(5,111) = 21.806,p < .01. In the final model,only 3 of the variables were statistically significant,with revenue recording the highest beta value followed by size of firm and finally tenure. Implications for positive social change include the potential to ensure equitable total compensation of the CEO,which aligns with the performance of the health insurance firm. In addition,compensation committees may utilize the results of this study to assess the current compensation of CEOs within the health insurance industry to ensure that the total compensation aligns with the performance of the firm.

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