Identity Politics,Redistribution,and Democratic Stability.

详细信息   

• 作者：Sinmazdemir ; Nazif Tolga.
• 学历：Doctor
• 年：2012
• 毕业院校：New York University
• Department：Politics.
• ISBN：9781267260253
• CBH：3502727
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：1486102
• Pages：197

文摘

What are the conditions under which democracies remain stable when there is inter-group conflict both over income redistribution and ethnic identity-based policies? I answer this question by constructing a game-theoretic model of two-dimensional electoral competition in which the poor and the rich from an ethnic majority and the poor ethnic minority compete in elections,and they resort to violence to implement their ideal policies if they are dissatisfied with election results. The model shows that group incentives for using violence depend on the anticipated costs of defeat by the rival group with opposite policy preferences on both dimensions of inter-group conflict. Hence,when redistribution rate is high,the poor minority group with ethnic grievances has stronger incentives for violence when their income is closer to the national average since then a potential defeat by the rich is less costly. I test this prediction by collecting province-level data on per capita income,public investment,and attacks on civilians by the Kurdish insurgency in Turkey,where demands for granting political autonomy to the Kurdish minority are being rejected. My empirical analysis supports the prediction: In poor provinces that receive high levels of public investment,insurgents attacks are more likely when per-capita income levels are closer to the national average. In the case of a rich minority,the rival group with opposite preferences is the poor from the majority. Hence,applying the logic of the model to a rich minority,I also claim that when redistribution rate is low,a rich minority group with ethnic grievances has weaker incentives to resort to violence when their income is further away from the national average since then a defeat by the poor of the majority is more costly. I test the relation between tax rates,income inequality,and minority incentives to resort to violence also at cross-national,group-level by using the available data on income of various ethnic groups,rates of income redistribution,and civil war onset. While the evidence strongly supports my hypothesis regarding poor minorities,the results are mixed with respect to my claim about rich minorities.