Organizational form,ownership structure and top executive turnover: Evidence in the property-liability insurance industry.

详细信息   

• 作者：Lin ; Tzu Ting.
• 学历：Ph.D.
• 年：2011
• 导师：Cummins, J. David,eadvisorWeiss, Maryecommittee memberRegan, Laureenecommittee memberElyasiani, Elyasecommittee memberMao, Connieecommittee member
• 毕业院校：Temple University
• Department：Business Administration/Risk Management and Insurance
• ISBN：9781124478739
• CBH：3440440
• Country：USA
• 语种：English
• FileSize：676493
• Pages：161

文摘

I investigate the role of organizational form and ownership structure in corporate governance by examining CEO turnover decision in the property-casualty insurance industry. The likelihoods of turnover and non-routine turnover are significantly and negatively associated to firm performance, and the outside succession dominates when non-routine turnover occurs. Further, the firm's magnitude of turnover-performance sensitivity depends on its quality of the corporate governance mechanisms which are determined by organizational form and ownership structure. The sensitivity of non-routine turnover to firm performance is lower in mutuals than publicly held non-family firms. Non-family-member CEOs in publicly listed family firms have the highest likelihoods of turnover and performance-turnover sensitivity among all types of companies. Manager-owned stock insurance companies have the lowest turnover rate and sensitivity of non-routine turnover to firm performance. Also incoming successors mainly come from the controlling family no matter what the turnover type is.