Wage bargaining and induced technical change in a linear economy: Model and application to the US (1963-2003)
- 作者：Daniele Tavani ; daniele.tavani@colostate.edu
- 关键词：E24 ; E25 ; J52 ; O31
- 刊名：Structural Change and Economic Dynamics
- 出版年：2012
- 期刊代码：64_0954349x
- 类别：eco
- 出版时间：June, 2012
- 卷：23
- 期：2
- 页码：117-126
- 文件大小：396 K
摘要
In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy operating at full capacity, wages are set through generalized axiomatic bargaining 脿 la . As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor-augmenting innovations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction (). The aggregate environment resulting by self-interested decisions made by economic agents is described by a two-dimensional dynamical system in the employment rate and output/capital ratio. The economy converges cyclically to a long-run equilibrium involving a Harrod-neutral profile of technical change, a constant rate of employment of labor, and constant input shares. The type of oscillations predicted by the model matches qualitatively the available data on the United States (1963-2003). Institutional change, as captured by variations in workers鈥?bargaining power, has a positive effect on the rate of output growth but a negative effect on employment.