Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core

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• 作者：Akira Okada ; ^{aokada@econ.hit-u.ac.jp}
• 关键词：C71 ; C72 ; D51 ; D82
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Theory
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：70_00220531
• 类别：eco
• 出版时间：May, 2012
• 卷：147
• 期：3
• 页码：1165-1190
• 文件大小：261 K

摘要

In an exchange economy with incomplete information, the signaling core is defined by the set of state-contingent allocations to which no coalitions object under informational leakage through proposals by informed agents. An objection underlying the signaling core is supported by a sequential equilibrium of an ultimatum bargaining game with an informed proposer. We prove that a stationary sequential equilibrium allocation in a Rubinstein-type sequential bargaining game with a restart rule belongs to the signaling core if the belief of players satisfies a self-selection property.