Discontinuous stable games and efficient Nash equilibria

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• 作者：Vincenzo Scalzo ; ^{vincenzo.scalzo@unina.it} ; ^{scalzo@unina.it}
• 关键词：C72
• 刊名：Economics Letters
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：9_01651765
• 类别：eco
• 出版时间：June, 2012
• 卷：115
• 期：3
• 页码：387-389
• 文件大小：197 K

摘要

In the recent paper by the author [Scalzo, V., 2010. Pareto efficient Nash equilibria in discontinuous games. Economics Letters 107, 364-365], a class of discontinuous games where efficient Nash equilibria exist has been defined. In the present paper, we complete the previous investigation and recognize a class of discontinuous games where the efficient Nash equilibria are stable with respect to perturbations of the characteristics of players.