Crisis discussions in psychology鈥擭ew historical and philosophical perspectives

详细信息	查看全文 | 推荐本文 |

• 作者：Thomas Sturm^a ; ¹ ; ^{tsturm@mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de} ; Annette Mü ; lberger^b ; ¹ ; ^{Annette.Mulberger@uab.cat}
• 关键词：Kuhn ; Crisis in science ; Philosophy of psychology ; Historiography
• 刊名：Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C ; Biological and Biomedical Sciences
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：113_13698486
• 类别：soc
• 出版时间：June, 2012
• 卷：43
• 期：2
• 页码：425-433
• 文件大小：232 K

摘要

In this introductory article, we provide a historical and philosophical framework for studying crisis discussions in psychology. We first trace the various meanings of crisis talk outside and inside of the sciences. We then turn to Kuhn鈥檚 concept of crisis, which is mainly an analyst鈥檚 category referring to severe clashes between theory and data. His view has also dominated many discussions on the status of psychology: Can it be considered a 鈥渕ature鈥?science, or are we dealing here with a pre- or multi-paradigmatic discipline? Against these Kuhnian perspectives, we point out that especially, but not only in psychology distinctive crisis declarations and debates have taken place since at least the late 19th century. In these, quite different usages of crisis talk have emerged, which can be determined by looking at (a) the content and (b) the dimensions of the declarations, as well as (c) the functions these declarations had for their authors. Thus, in psychology at least, 鈥榗risis鈥?has been a vigorous actor鈥檚 category, occasionally having actual effects on the future course of research. While such crisis declarations need not be taken at face value, they nevertheless help to break the spell of Kuhnian analyses of psychology鈥檚 history. They should inform ways in which the history and philosophy of psychology is studied further.