A good man is hard to find: Marriage as an institution
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摘要
This paper presents a model of marriage as an institution that changes the incentives of a mating game between men and women. Unlike other models of the family, decisions to invest in children are not contractible ex ante, but must be sub-game perfect given that intimacy and pregnancy are sequential. Marriage and divorce, which are publicly observable, create costs for exiting a match; informal relationships do not. Providing an institution which makes a match observable, marriage, improves incentives for men to invest costly unobservable effort in their children.

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