Forward-looking behavior in Hawk-Dove games in endogenous networks: Experimental evidence

详细信息	查看全文 | 推荐本文 |

• 作者：Siegfried K. Berninghaus ^{siegfried.berninghaus@kit.edu} ; Karl-Martin Ehrhart ^{ehrhart@kit.edu} ; Marion Ott ; ¹ ; ^{marion.ott@rwth-aachen.de}
• 关键词：C72 ; C91 ; C92 ; D85
• 刊名：Games and Economic Behavior
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：67_08998256
• 类别：mt
• 出版时间：May, 2012
• 卷：75
• 期：1
• 页码：35-52
• 文件大小：288 K

摘要

We conduct an experiment in continuous time: every subject can change her links to others and her action in a Hawk-Dove game, which she plays bilaterally with each of her linked partners, at any time. We hypothesize that norms exist regarding who establishes and thus pays for links, and that players take these norms into account when deciding on their strategy. For such limitedly forward-looking players who consider others始 linking reactions we introduce a strategy adaptation rule (Anticipatory Better-Reply Rule, ABR) and a related stability criterion (Reaction-Anticipatingly Stable, RAS). Our data support our assumption on linking reactions. Subjects seem to take these reactions into account when deciding to switch from Hawk to Dove (ABR-behavior). However, better-reply behavior is prevalent when short-term profits allure. RAS configurations occur more often than Nash equilibria of the base game; however, with respect to stability they perform similar.