Corporate board dynamics: Directors voting for directors

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• 作者：Steven Schmeiser ^{steven@schmeiser.org}
• 关键词：G3 ; L5 ; D7
• 刊名：Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：36_01672681
• 类别：eco
• 出版时间：May, 2012
• 卷：82
• 期：2-3
• 页码：505-524
• 文件大小：1892 K

摘要

I propose a model in which corporate directors perform firm tasks (such as monitoring management) and elect new directors. Elections introduce a dynamic element - the incumbent board's willingness to hire a candidate depends on how the candidate will vote in future hiring rounds. Lack of a commitment mechanism means directors do not always choose board compositions that maximize shareholder value. I use the model to analytically and numerically investigate the effects of stock exchange rules governing board composition and director elections. I find that the regulations benefit shareholders in a dynamic environment, but not in a static environment.