Not semantics but just results: The use of linguistic analysis in constitutional interpretation
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摘要
The role of judges is to apply the law in order to decide disputes. In so doing, they are often called upon to interpret statutory and constitutional provisions, and their opinions in such cases may be presented as linguistic analyses. This paper examines the use of linguistic arguments in the case of District of Columbia v. Heller, in which the United States Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a statute severely restricting the right to possess firearms violated the Second Amendment of the federal Constitution. The parties advanced conflicting interpretations of the amendment which the Court resolved on ostensibly semantic grounds, provoking a strong dissent that criticized the majority's interpretation as unfounded. This paper presents an analysis of the Court's majority opinion that seeks to demonstrate the problems that arise when the rules and principles that are used to decide a case are linguistic rather than legal. I argue that the focus of the law is justice and not semantics, and it is therefore inappropriate to limit the analysis of legal questions to linguistic arguments. In so doing, I demonstrate the role of applied pragmatics in exploding an interpretive strategy that has proven to be impervious to legal argument.

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