摘要
CO2 from coal-fired power generation accounts for 43%of the total emissions in China. The Chinese government has constructed an emissions trading market, but the total allotment for the power industry is not be proposed. This raises some core issues in the emissions trading market, including how to set the total emissions level and how to distribute initial emissions rights. In this report, evolutionary game theory was adopted to set the total emissions control level based on the coordination between economy and environment in the development process. This coordination was expressed as the ratio between the reduction of electricity volume due to the reduction of one unit emissions and the increase of electricity volume due to the increase of one unit emissions. A swarm simulation model based on multi-agent game theory was proposed, and a simulation example was carried out. After the total emissions standard is set by the government, power companies can decide their price, sales and emissions volume as part of electricity market and emissions rights market. In this simulation, it was found that, with a decline of total emissions, total electricity volume is not monotonically decrease. The change of electricity volume is a dynamic process, in which the electricity volume declined initially, and then increased, decreased in the end. The rates of reduction and increase are different, which provides a scientific basis to set total emissions volume for the power industry.