The newsvendor鈥檚 optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers

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• 作者：Zhengping Wu^a ; ^{zpwu@smu.edu.sg} ; Pascale Crama^a ; ^{pcrama@smu.edu.sg} ; Wanshan Zhu^b ; ^{zhuws@tsinghua.edu.cn}
• 关键词：Newsvendor model ; Inventory ; Pricing ; Mechanism design ; Revenue management
• 刊名：European Journal of Operational Research
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：58_03772217
• 类别：et
• 出版时间：1 July, 2012
• 卷：220
• 期：1
• 页码：171-181
• 文件大小：758 K

摘要

We consider a newsvendor who earns a revenue from the sales of her product to end users as well as from multiple advertisers paying to obtain access to those end users. We study the optimal decisions of a price-taking and a price-setting newsvendor when the advertisers have private information about their willingness to pay. We focus on the impact of the number of advertisers on the newsvendor鈥檚 optimal decisions. We find that regardless of the number of advertisers, the newsvendor may exclude advertisers with a low willingness to pay and distort the price and inventory from their system-efficient levels to screen the advertisers. Moreover, the newsvendor鈥檚 decision to exclude an advertiser is based exclusively on that advertiser鈥檚 characteristics, and the newsvendor鈥檚 optimal decision thus reveals independence among the advertisers. Nonetheless, the profits of the newsvendor and the advertisers also display network effects as both increase in the number of advertisers. Finally, our numerical results show that the newsvendor prefers an equivalent single advertiser to multiple advertisers due to the pooling effect.