Low-quality leadership in a vertically differentiated duopoly with Cournot competition

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• 作者：Luca Lambertini^a ; ^b ; ^{luca.lambertini@unibo.it} ; Alessandro Tampieri^a ; ^{alessandro.tampieri@unibo.it}
• 关键词：C73 ; L13
• 刊名：Economics Letters
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：9_01651765
• 类别：eco
• 出版时间：June, 2012
• 卷：115
• 期：3
• 页码：396-398
• 文件大小：224 K

摘要

We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame, perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leader鈥檚 role.