Koffka, K枚hler, and the 鈥渃risis鈥?in psychology
- 作者：Gary Hatfield hatfield@phil.upenn.edu
- 关键词：German psychology ; Gestalt psychology ; New experimental psychology ; Phenomenal organization ; Philosophical style ; Philosophical psychology
- 刊名：Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C ; Biological and Biomedical Sciences
- 出版年：2012
- 期刊代码：113_13698486
- 类别：soc
- 出版时间：June, 2012
- 卷：43
- 期：2
- 页码：483-492
- 文件大小：239 K
摘要
This paper examines the claims of the Gestalt psychologists that there was a crisis in experimental psychology ca. 1900, which arose because the prevailing sensory atomism excluded meaning from among psychological phenomena. The Gestaltists claim that a primary motivation of their movement was to show, against the speculative psychologists and philosophers and Verstehen historians, that natural scientific psychology can handle meaning. Purportedly, they revealed this motivation in their initial German-language presentations but in English emphasized their scientific accomplishments for an American audience. The paper finds that: there was a recognized crisis in the new experimental psychology ca. 1900 pertaining especially to sensory atomism; that the Gestaltists responded to the crisis with new experimental findings and theoretical concepts (Gestalten) that challenged atomism; in both languages, they raised problems of meaning and discussed the contest with speculative psychology and philosophy only after presenting their scientific case; that they introduced phenomenological observations on meaning and perceptual organization into their psychology but did not develop a theory of meaning or solve philosophical problems; that they argued 鈥減hilosophically,鈥?that is, using abstract, conceptual arguments; and that this aspect of their cognitive style was not received well by some prominent members of their American audience.