The codetermined firm in a Cournot duopoly: A stability analysis

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• 作者：Luciano Fanti¹ ; ^{lfanti@ec.unipi.it} ; ^{fanti.luciano@gmail.com} ; Luca Gori ; ^{luca.gori@unige.it} ; ^{dr.luca.gori@gmail.com}
• 关键词：C62 ; D43 ; L13
• 刊名：Economic Modelling
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：7_02649993
• 类别：eco
• 出版时间：July, 2012
• 卷：29
• 期：4
• 页码：1242-1247
• 文件大小：351 K

摘要

This paper aims to study the stability issue in a Cournot duopoly with codetermined firms. We show that when both firms codetermine employment together with decentralised employees' representatives, a rise in wages acts as an economic (de)stabiliser when the wage is fairly (high) low, while under profit maximisation a rise in wages always acts as a stabilising device because the parametric stability region monotonically increases with the wage in such a case. Moreover, a rise in the union's bargaining power has a de-stabilising effect, except when the wage is low and the firm power is already high. Therefore, under codetermination a change either in the wage or firm power in the Nash bargaining plays an ambiguous role on stability. We also show with numerical simulations that complex dynamics can also occur.