Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes

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• 作者：Toru Suzuki ^{tsuzuki007@gmail.com}
• 关键词：D82 ; D83 ; O32
• 刊名：Games and Economic Behavior
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：67_08998256
• 类别：mt
• 出版时间：July, 2012
• 卷：75
• 期：2
• 页码：1009-1013
• 文件大小：127 K

摘要

Agents compete to solve a problem. Each agent simultaneously chooses either a safe method or a risky method to solve the problem. This paper analyzes a prize scheme as an incentive to induce the optimal risk-taking level which maximizes the designer始s interest. It is shown that whenever the winner-take-all scheme induces excessive risk-taking, there exists a prize scheme which induces the optimal risk-taking. Moreover, the existence of such a prize scheme is guaranteed if the number of competitors is sufficiently large.