摘要
In this paper I analyze David Kaplan始s essay 鈥淥pacity鈥? In 鈥淥pacity鈥?Kaplan attempts to dismiss Quine始s concerns about quantification across intensional (modal and intentional) operators. I argue that Kaplan succeeds in showing that quantification across intensional operators is logically coherent and that quantified modal logic is strictly speaking not committed to essentialism. However, I also argue that this is not in and of itself sufficient to support Kaplan始s more ambitious attempt to move beyond purely logical results and provide unified, uncontroversial interpretations of both 鈥渂elieves鈥?and 鈥渘ecessarily鈥? In the paper I raise several questions about the subject matter of logic and the role of semantics, with special focus on singular propositions.