A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets

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• 作者：Ron Lavi ; ^{ronlavi@ie.technion.ac.il} ; Marina May ^{didra@techunix.technion.ac.il}
• 关键词：C70 ; D44 ; D82
• 刊名：Economics Letters
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：9_01651765
• 类别：eco
• 出版时间：April, 2012
• 卷：115
• 期：1
• 页码：100-103
• 文件大小：199 K

摘要

We show that any deterministic mechanism, for allocating identical items that are complements to budget-constrained bidders, cannot simultaneously satisfy individual-rationality, strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency, and no-positive-transfers. This holds even for two bidders, two items, and commonly-known budgets, and generalizes to richer settings.