Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: Identification, estimation and application to construction procurements

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• 作者：Sandra Campo ^{campo@email.unc.edu}
• 关键词：C14 ; C15 ; D44 ; L50 ; L74
• 刊名：Journal of Econometrics
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：31_03044076
• 类别：mt
• 出版时间：May, 2012
• 卷：168
• 期：1
• 页码：96-107
• 文件大小：430 K

摘要

This article studies a model of asymmetric risk averse bidding within the independent private value paradigm. The inherent asymmetry in cost and risk aversion imposes an original restriction on the observed bid data, an exact equality which leads to the model semiparametric identification and estimation. The unobserved arguments of this equality need to be simulated in order to estimate the bidders鈥?Constant Relative Risk Aversion or Constant Absolute Risk Aversion parameters and their heterogeneous cost distributions. In the Los Angeles City Hall construction contracts offered between 1994 and 2003, the model and methodology help reveal that financial asymmetries affect the firms鈥?cost distribution, while experience influences their degree of risk aversion.