On optimal bidding in sequential procurement auctions

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• 作者：Michael N. Katehakis^a ; ^{mnk@rutgers.edu} ; Kartikeya S. Puranam^a ; ^b ; ^{kartys.here@gmail.com}
• 关键词：Auctions ; Dynamic bidding ; Newsvendor ; Procurement
• 刊名：Operations Research Letters
• 出版年：2012
• 期刊代码：134_01676377
• 类别：et
• 出版时间：July, 2012
• 卷：40
• 期：4
• 页码：244-249
• 文件大小：255 K

摘要

We investigate the problem of optimal bidding for a firm that in each period procures items to meet a random demand by participating in a finite sequence of auctions. We develop a new model for a firm where its item valuation derives from the sale of the acquired items via their demand distribution, sale price, acquisition cost, salvage value and lost sales. We establish monotonicity properties for the value function and the optimal dynamic bid strategy and we present computations.