Managing specific accruals vs. structuring transactions: Evidence from banking industry
- 作者：Xiaoyan Cheng ; xiaoyanchen1@unomaha.edu
- 关键词：Loan loss provisions ; Gains ; Securitization and loan sales ; SFAS No. 140 ; Earnings benchmarks
- 刊名：Advances in Accounting
- 出版年：2012
- 期刊代码：P23_08826110
- 类别：bus
- 出版时间：June, 2012
- 卷：28
- 期：1
- 页码：22-37
- 文件大小：463 K
摘要
This study investigates earnings management through managing specific accruals vs. structuring transactions in the banking industry. This paper explores the circumstances under which banks manipulate loan loss provisions vs. circumstances that lead banks to structure loan sales and securitizations for the purpose of achieving earnings benchmarks. Empirical results show that banks manage earnings through loan loss provisions, before resorting to structuring transactions, to avoid small earnings decreases and or just meet or beat analysts' forecasts. The findings imply that structuring loan sales and securitizations is more likely to be used as a secondary instrument. In addition, I find that the earnings of banks with lower discretionary loan loss provisions and higher discretionary gains from loan sales and securitizations are priced more negatively, suggesting that investors impose incremental penalties on the joint use of loan loss provisions and gains from loan sales and securitization to meet or beat earnings benchmarks.