Lottery or waiting-line auction?

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• 作者：Taylor ; Grant A. ; Tsui ; Kevin K.K. ; Zhu ; Lijing
• 关键词：Allocation mechanisms ; Lottery ; Waiting-line auction ; Rent dissipation ; Social surplus ; C15 ; D44 ; D61
• 刊名：Journal of Public Economics
• 出版年：2003
• 期刊代码：51_00472727
• 类别：eco
• 出版时间：May, 2003
• 卷：87
• 期：5-6
• 页码：1313-1334
• 文件大小：113 K

摘要

This paper studies the efficiencies of the two most widely used non-price allocation mechanisms: lotteries and waiting-line auctions. As our analysis suggests, in addition to the fairness of the mechanism, the use of lotteries in lieu of waiting-line auctions can be also justified from an efficiency point of view. In particular, we show that the less dispersed consumers’ time valuations are, the more efficient is a lottery relative to a waiting-line auction. In addition, we identify four conditions under which a lottery dominates a waiting-line auction in expected social surplus preserving. Furthermore, the numerical simulations we conduct indicate that over a predominantly wide range of circumstances, a lottery is more socially efficient than a waiting-line auction as an allocative mechanism in the absence of a conventional price system.