Subgame perfect implementation: A full characterization
- 作者：Hannu Vartiainen
- 关键词：Subgame perfect equilibrium ; Implementation ; Characterization
- 刊名：Journal of Economic Theory
- 出版年：2007
- 期刊代码：70_00220531
- 类别：eco
- 出版时间：March 2007
- 卷：133
- 期：1
- 页码：111-126
- 文件大小：240 K
摘要
Moore and Repullo [Subgame perfect implementation, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1191–1220], and Abreu and Sen [Subgame perfect implementation: a necessary and almost sufficient condition, J. Econ. Theory 50 (1990) 285–299] introduce distinct necessary and sufficient conditions for SPE implementation, when the number of players is at least three. This paper closes the gap between the conditions—a complete characterization of the SPE implementable choice rules is provided. The characterization consists of me="mml1">method=retrieve&_udi=B6WJ3-4HJRS41-1&_mathId=mml1&_user=10&_cdi=6867&_rdoc=6&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_userid=10&md5=3faca2d98822747a3cceee8b58f67e13" title="Click to view the MathML source">α*, which strengthens me="mml2">method=retrieve&_udi=B6WJ3-4HJRS41-1&_mathId=mml2&_user=10&_cdi=6867&_rdoc=6&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_userid=10&md5=07b83fc1b0314a14c5d50c8706bf0fe5" title="Click to view the MathML source">α of Abreu–Sen by adding it a restricted veto-power condition, and the unanimity condition. Under strict preferences me="mml3">method=retrieve&_udi=B6WJ3-4HJRS41-1&_mathId=mml3&_user=10&_cdi=6867&_rdoc=6&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_userid=10&md5=b8375e69c1dd3a4f59c21661ec4a4c4f" title="Click to view the MathML source">α* is equal to me="mml4">method=retrieve&_udi=B6WJ3-4HJRS41-1&_mathId=mml4&_user=10&_cdi=6867&_rdoc=6&_acct=C000050221&_version=1&_userid=10&md5=f8dd89c762db5582faad971d883deb86" title="Click to view the MathML source">α.