Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, Rational choice, action,and the paradox of rebellion
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- 作者：Holcombe ; Randall G.
- 刊名：Public Choice
- 出版时间：1999
- 出版年：1999
- 期刊代码：57_00485829
- 类别：law
- 卷：101
- 期：1/2
- 页码：156-159
- 数据来源：sp
摘要
The traditional literature on agency models predicts that, for zeroliability contracts, it is optimal for the principal to pay for theinformation he cannot observe. However, this principle is not valid for aset of contracts mostly used by government agencies whose distinguishingfeature is represented by a stringent budget constraint for the principal.This paper shows that in this environment the principal will either choose astructure exibiting pooling or a bargaining solution. The bargainingsolution represents the analytical proof to the intuition of the difficultyin implementing procurement contracts stated by Laffont and Tirole (1993).