摘要
On Two Types of Realism in Quantum Theory. Current realist approaches to the foundations of quantum theoryemphasize the dichotomy between (Copenhagen) positivism and`beable'-realism. Recently it was even attempted to turn thispicture into two (equally possible) histories in order tolegitimate Bohmian Mechanics as a viable alternative. This paperargues that this dichotomy is philosophically inadequate andhistorically questionable by embedding it into the philosophicaldiscussion on positivism and realism that has taken place since the1920s. Logical Empiricists back then advocated empirical realismand contrasted it to absolutistic metaphysical realism. Fromthis viewpoint David Bohm's `beable'-realism combines elements ofMach's sensualism with a pre-Kantian metaphysics. As WesleySalmon's position shows, empirical realism can become quitepronounced without relapsing into Bohmian philosophy. Instead it arrives close to the GRWP-interpretation. Hence, when Bernard d'Espagnatbinds both together as `ontological interpretations', he blursthe borderline between empirical and metaphysical realism that hisVeiled Reality has set out to draw, quite inconcordance with Logical Empiricism.