超越反转的第二意象——国家间战争、个体社会流动和福利国家的军事起源
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摘要
"三个意象"提出近60年来,国际—国家—个体三个层次如何互动的研究一直缺乏微观基础。经典文献运用"战争打造国家"的理论,认为战争通过加强国家能力为福利国家推行再分配政策奠定基础。作者挑战了这一观点,提出一个拥有微观基础的战争补偿理论,并通过定量分析1800—2010年间19个西方主要国家累进所得税税率与其在该时期所有重大国际战争中动员和死亡规模之间的关系,论证军事动员由于能够提高个体的社会流动,反而会降低社会的整体再分配需求。只有战争造成的伤亡才会迫使国家提高税率,用收入再分配补偿战时的牺牲。该研究通过揭示军人个体层面的主观社会流动预期和再分配偏好,为国家间战争(国际因素)对福利国家(国内政治)的影响提供了微观基础,为我们理解国际体系、国内政治以及个体偏好三者间的互动如何形塑重大政治变迁提供了示例。
For sixty years since the publication of Men,the State and War,the literature rarely provides micro-foundations for the intertwining of the three images in shaping political outcomes. This article aims to fill this gap by looking into the historical development of the welfare state. The conventional view, following the "war-makesstate" thesis, argues that war necessitates state intervention and fosters state capacities,which lays the administrative and fiscal foundations for the welfare state. Challenging this view,this article argues that mass mobilization during war preparation by increasing prospects of social mobility actually reduces the demand for redistribution. It is casualties during war that compel the state to compensate the sacrifice through income redistribution. This compensatory theory of mass mobilization and sacrifice is supported by statistical analysis of a new dataset of progressive taxation and interstate war participation of 19 Great Powers during 1800-2010. This article gives an example of how the three images interact on the basis of micro-level preferences to bring about domestic political change.
For sixty years since the publication of Men,the State and War,the literature rarely provides micro-foundations for the intertwining of the three images in shaping political outcomes. This article aims to fill this gap by looking into the historical development of the welfare state. The conventional view, following the "war-makesstate" thesis, argues that war necessitates state intervention and fosters state capacities,which lays the administrative and fiscal foundations for the welfare state. Challenging this view,this article argues that mass mobilization during war preparation by increasing prospects of social mobility actually reduces the demand for redistribution. It is casualties during war that compel the state to compensate the sacrifice through income redistribution. This compensatory theory of mass mobilization and sacrifice is supported by statistical analysis of a new dataset of progressive taxation and interstate war participation of 19 Great Powers during 1800-2010. This article gives an example of how the three images interact on the basis of micro-level preferences to bring about domestic political change.
引文
(1)Kenneth N.Waltz,Man,the State and War,New York:Columbia University Press,1959.
(2)肯尼思·华尔兹在三个意象的基础上重点关注国际体系/结构对单元的决定作用,由此形成结构现实主义。这种体系层次的分析还影响了自由主义和其后的建构主义。后来对结构现实主义的批判主要集中在两个方面:一是理论层面,批评其忽略了单元的作用以及单元结构对自身行为模式的影响;二是现实层面,批评其无法解释冷战和平结束这样重大的国际结构转变。前者参见James E.Dougherty and Robert L.Pfaltzgraff,Jr.,Contending Theories of International Relations:A Comprehensive Survey,London:Longman,2000,pp.85-87;后者参见Jeffrey W.Legro and Andrew Moravcsik,“Is Anybody Still a Realist?”International Security,Vol.24,No.2,1999,pp.5-55;Fareed Zakaria,“Is Realism Finished?”National Interest,Vol.30,1992,pp.21-32;Ethan B.Kapstein,“Is Realism Dead?The Domestic Sources of International Politics,”International Organization,Vol.49,No.4,1995,pp.751-774。冷战终结和全球化的双重冲击使得现实主义内部也开始反思体系决定论,由此产生了融合国内政治结构的新古典现实主义(neo-classical realism)。
(3)尽管许多学者对政治科学的研究层次进行了不同划分,但总的来说都能和肯尼思·华尔兹的三层次契合。参见Kenneth N.Waltz,Man,the State and War,pp.600-608;J.David Singer,“The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,”World Politics,Vol.14,No.1,1961,pp.77-92;James Rosenau,The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy,London:Frances Printer,1980,pp.115-169;Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr,World Politics:A Menu for Choice,New York:W.H.Freeman,1992,pp.11-17。
(4)吴其胜在文章中将广义的跨层次分析分为四种模式,分别是“国内因素如何造成了国际后果的‘第二意象’,国际体系因素如何影响国内政治的‘反转第二意象’,将国内政治作为国际体系影响国家行为的中间变量的顺时分析,以及同时用国内和国际政治压力解释国际现象的共时分析”。参见吴其胜:《国际关系研究中的跨层次分析》,载《外交评论》,2008年第1期,第88-97页。
(5)Peter Gourevitch,“The Second Image Reversed:The International Sources of Domestic Politics,”International Organization,Vol.32,No.4,1978,pp.881-912.
(1)Judith Kelley,“International Actors on the Domestic Scene:Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions,”International Organization,Vol.58,No.3,2004,pp.425-457;Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore,“Complex Global Governance and Domestic Policies:Four Pathways of Influence,”International Affairs,Vol.88,No.3,2012,pp.585-604;Xun Cao,“Global Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence:A Network Explanation of Policy Changes,”World Politics,Vol.64,No.3,2012,pp.375-425.
(2)Joseph M.Grieco,et al.,“Let’s Get a Second Opinion:International Institutions and American Public Support for War,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.55,No.2,2011,pp.563-583;Courtenay R.Conrad and Emily Hencken Ritter,“Treaties,Tenure,and Torture:The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law,”Journal of Politics,Vol.75,No.2,2013,pp.397-409;田野:《国际制度对国内政治的影响机制---来自理性选择制度主义的解释》,载《世界经济与政治》,2011年第1期,第5-24页。
(3)根据罗伯特·基欧汉的定义,国际制度包括基于明确协议和目的建立的国际组织,建立在国家认可基础上、涉及特定问题的明确规则的国际机制(包括国际法)以及国际惯例。这一部分文献参见Andrew P.Cortell and James W.Davis,Jr.,“Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms:A Research Agenda,”International Studies Review,Vol.2,No.1,2000,pp.65-87;Jon C.Pevehouse,“Democracy from the Outside-In?International Organizations and Democratization,”International Organization,Vol.56,No.3,2002,pp.515-549;Alexandru Grigorescu,“International Organizations and Government Transparency:Linking the International and Domestic Realms,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.47,No.4,2003,pp.643-667;Songying Fang,“The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.52,No.2,2008,pp.304-321;Leonardo Baccini and Johannes Urpelainen,“Before Ratification:Understanding the Timing of International Treaty Effects on Domestic Policies,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.58,No.1,2013,pp.29-43;田野:《国际制度对国内政治的影响机制---来自理性选择制度主义的解释》,载《世界经济与政治》,2011年第1期,第5-24页。
(4)Brian Burgoon,“Globalization and Welfare Compensation:Disentangling the Ties That Bind,”International Organization,Vol.55,No.3,2001,pp.509-551;Nita Rudra,“Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.49,No.4,2010,pp.704-730;Mark Andreas Kayser,“How Domestic Is Domestic Politics?Globalization and Elections,”Annual Review of Political Science,Vol.10,No.1,2007,pp.341-362;Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore,“Complex Global Governance and Domestic Policies:Four Pathways of Influence,”pp.585-604.
(5)Clayton L.Thyne,“Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences:The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.50,No.6,2006,pp.937-961;Indridi H.Indridason,“Does Terrorism Influence Domestic Politics?Coalition Formation and Terrorist Incidents,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.2,2008,pp.241-259;Douglas M.Gibler,“Outside-In:The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.54,No.4,2010,pp.519-542;王凯:《国家间战争与国内族群冲突》,载《世界经济与政治》,2018年第2期,第71-96页。
(6)Susan D.Hyde,“The Observer Effect in International Politics:Evidence from a Natural Experiment,”World Politics,Vol.60,No.1,2007,pp.37-63;Mark Andreas Kayser,“How Domestic Is Domestic Politics?Globalization and Elections,”pp.341-362.
(1)Jon C.Pevehouse,“Democracy from the Outside-In?International Organizations and Democratization,”pp.515-549;Alexandru Grigorescu,“International Organizations and Government Transparency:Linking the International and Domestic Realms,”pp.643-667;Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D.Ward,“Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization,”International Organization,Vol.60,No.4,2006,pp.911-933;Nita Rudra,“Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World,”pp.704-730.
(2)Rajat Ganguly and Raymond Taras,Understanding Ethnic Conflict:The International Dimension,New York:Longman,2002;Clayton L.Thyne,“Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences:The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War,”pp.937-961;Jeffrey T.Checkel,ed.,Transnational Dynamics of Civil War,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2013;王凯:《国家间战争与国内族群冲突》,载《世界经济与政治》,2018年第2期,第71-96页。
(3)约书亚·科兹认为,近些年对微观基础的关注超越了在方法论和认识论上的隔阂,理性主义的舆情实验和建构主义、批判理论都关注微观因素的作用。前者包括Joshua D.Kertzer and Kathleen M.McG raw,“Folk Realism:Testing the Microfoundations of Realism in Ordinary Citizens,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.56,No.2,2012,pp.245-258;Michael Tomz and Jessica L.Weeks,“Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace,”American Political Science Review,Vol.107,No.4,2013,pp.849-865;A.Burcu Bayram,“What Drives Modern Diogenes?Individual Values and Cosmopolitan Allegiance,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.21,No.2,2015,pp.451-479;Jonathan Renshon,“Losing Face and Sinking Costs:Experimental Evidence on the Judgment of Political and Military Leaders,”International Organization,Vol.69,No.3,2015,pp.659-695。后者包括Ted Hopf,“The Logic of Habit in International Relations,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.16,No.4,2010,pp.539-561;Todd H.Hall and Andrew A.G.Ross,“Affective Politics After 9/11,”International Organization,Vol.69,No.4,2015,pp.847-879;Ty Solomon and Brent J.Steele,“Micro-Moves in International Relations Theory,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.23,No.2,2017,pp.267-291。科兹的文章参见Joshua D.Kertzer,“Microfoundations in International Relations,”Conflict Management and Peace Science,Vol.34,No.1,2017,pp.81-97。
(1)Songying Fang,“The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics,”pp.304-321;Kishore Gawande,Pravin Krishna and Marcelo Olarreaga,“What Governments Maximize and Why:The View from Trade,”International Organization,Vol.63,No.3,2009,pp.491-531;Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür,“The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction Between International Institutions,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.15,No.1,2009,pp.125-126;Robert W.Rauchhaus,“Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention:Moral Hazards,Adverse Selection,and the Commitment Dilemma,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.53,No.4,2009,pp.871-884.
(2)Gsta Esping-Andersen,The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,Cambridge:Polity Press,1990;Walter Korpi,The Democratic Cass Struggle,London:Routledge,1983.
(3)例如,戈斯塔·艾斯平-安德森指出:“由于其既收税又花钱,因此福利国家在定义上就是再分配性的。”参见Gsta Esping-Andersen and J.Miles,“Economic Inequality and the Welfare State,”in Wiemer Salverda,Brian Nolan and Timothy M.Smeeding,eds.,The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality,Oxford,New York:Oxford University Press,2009,pp.639-664。因此,收入所得税的边际税率能够最直接地从税收角度揭示福利国家的再分配本质。至于支出角度,由于不同福利支出项目的再分配性质其实差异极大(例如,公立教育是在贫富阶层之间进行再分配,而失业保险是在就业人口和失业人口之间进行再分配,公共养老金的再分配则常常是在代际之间进行),因此不同福利支出项目的简单加总无法准确刻画作为福利国家本质的再分配的力度。出于这一原因,本文选择从税收角度用收入所得税的边际税率来衡量福利国家的本质。
(4)本文涵盖的国家包括:澳大利亚、奥地利、比利时、加拿大、丹麦、芬兰、法国、德国、爱尔兰、意大利、日本、荷兰、新西兰、挪威、西班牙、瑞典、瑞士、英国和美国。
(1)Federica Genovese,Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,Comparative Income Taxation Database,California:Stanford University Libraries,2016;Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,Taxing the Rich:A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe,Princeton and New York:Princeton University Press and Russell Sage Foundation,2016.
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(3)Karl Polanyi,The Great Transformation:The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time,New York:Rinehart,1944.
(1)Edward H.Carr,The Twenty Years’Crisis,1919-1939,An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,London:Palgrave Macmillan,1939.
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(4)Richard Morris Titmuss,Problems of Social Policy,1950.
(1)Charles Tilly,Coercion,Capital and European States,AD 990-1992,1990.
(2)Perry Anderson,Lineages of the Absolutist State,1974.
(3)Michael Mann,The Sources of Social Power:Volume 2,the Rise of Classes and Nation States 1760-1914,1993.
(1)Thomas H.Marshall,Citizenship and Social Class,and Other Essays,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1950.
(2)Harold L.Wilensky,The Welfare State and Equality,Oakland:University of California Press,1975;Harold L.Wilensky and Charles N.Lebeaux,Industrial Society and Social Welfare,1958.
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(1)Walter Korp,i“Power Resources and Employer:Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism:Protagonists,Consenters,and Antagonists,”World Politics,Vol.58,No.2,2006,pp.167-206;Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme,“New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization:Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries,1975-95,”pp.425-446.
(1)虽然人类历史上不乏普通平民受征召成为作战人员的实例(如14世纪的英法百年战争时的英格兰长弓兵),但西方真正以全民族作为军事动员对象的大众军队诞生于法国大革命战争(French Revolutionary Wars)之中。1793年1月路易十六被处死之后,普鲁士、奥地利、西班牙和英国等多国组成第一次反法联盟,向法国发动猛攻。四处作战的法国革命军捉襟见肘,遭受重大损失。共和国危在旦夕之际,革命急需补充兵源并扩大军队规模。于是1793年8月23日,国民议会发布大规模征兵公告(levée en masse),要求“从此刻开始,直至共和国的敌人被驱赶出这块土地,所有的法国人都要响应军队的征用要求”。所有18岁至25岁的身体健全的未婚男子都被立即征召进入军队。公告发出仅仅一年,法国革命军的总人数就从1793年年初的30万人激增至1794年9月的150万人。这支军队在拿破仑·波拿巴(Napoleon Bonaparte)和安德烈·马塞纳(AndréMasséna)等优秀将领的率领下,凭借着众多的人数和高昂的革命热情,不仅成功地将外国势力赶出法国,还在周边建立了许多姐妹共和国。这一过程不仅传播了大革命的精神,更将“公民军队”这种全新的战争组织模式带到了全欧洲,引起欧洲列强的震动和效仿。这种效仿常常遵循“竞争-模仿”的社会学习机制,即被公民军队威胁特别是击败的国家往往会在战后引入类似的全民兵役制(mass conscription)。拿破仑战争中被法军击溃并占领的普鲁士是拿破仑战争后法国全民兵役制的第一个模仿者,也是19世纪这一制度最坚定的贯彻者。其从1815年起就要求所有成年男性必须要服2年现役、5年预备役以及11年民兵役。现代世界最杰出的军事思想家、曾经做过拿破仑战俘的普鲁士人卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨(Carl Von Clausewitz)更是将自己的毕生精力奉献给对大规模平民战争的思考,思考的结晶就是《战争论》。1864年至1871年间,普鲁士将对平民的大规模动员与当时最先进的后勤运输技术---铁路结合起来,接连击败丹麦、奥地利和法国,直接迫使奥地利于1868年建立全民兵役制,迫使法国于1873年重拾曾经在拿破仑战争后被迫放弃的全民征兵。丹麦为应对之前就积极备战的普鲁士,早在1848年就推行了全民兵役。其对普鲁士战争的失败促使芬兰(1870年)、瑞典(1882年)和挪威(1905年)这些北欧国家先后建立了全民兵役制。即便是没有很强陆军动员传统的岛国---英国也在第一次世界大战的压力下于1916年实现了全民征兵。参见John Keegan,A History of Warfare,London:Vintage Books,1993。
(1)James J.Sheehan,Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?The Transformation of Modern Europe,London:Mariner Books,2009.
(2)Hans Joas and Wolfgang Kn9bl,Kriegsverdrngung:ein Problem in der Geschichte der Sozialtheorie,Frankfurt am Main:Suhrkamp,2008.
(3)Samuel E.Finer,The History of Government from the Earliest Times:Ancient Monarchies and Empires,New York:Oxford University Press,1997.
(1)Matthew Stavros,“Military Revolution in Early Modern Japan,”Japanese Studies,Vol.33,No.3,2013,pp.243-261.
(2)Ernest Barker,The Politics of Aristotle,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1948.
(3)Samuel E.Finer,The History of Government from the Earliest Times:Ancient Monarchies and Empires,p.17.
(1)Frank Jacob and Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo,The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe:A Revision,London:Springer,2016.
(2)Michael Mann,“The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism,”New Left Review,Vol.162,1987,pp.35-50.
(3)Thomas H.Marshall,Citizenship and Social Class,and Other Essays,1950.
(1)Samuel P.Huntington,The Soldier and the State,Cambridge:Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1957.
(2)在前现代社会中,我们也可以看到国家通过提高下层人民的社会地位来补偿其对军事活动的参与。例如,中国战国时期商鞅在秦国创立的二十级军功爵位制,规定包括秦国宗室在内的秦国人民一律按照军功大小授予从公士到彻侯的二十等爵位,待遇(田宅、仆人、服役负担甚至饭食标准)随爵位的上升而提高。这是一种直接以社会地位的提高鼓励和回报民众参军的制度。虽然存在以上历史实例,但受限于军队的阶级结构尚未完全下移以及民众缺乏政治权利,国家使用社会地位补偿战争参与的情况并不普遍。
(3)Chulhee Lee,“Military Positions and Post-Service Occupational Mobility of Union Army Veterans,1861-1880,”Explorations in Economic History,Vol.44,No.4,2007,pp.680-698;Chulhee Lee,“Military Service and Economic Mobility:Evidence from the American Civil War,”Explorations in Economic History,Vol.49,No.3,2012,pp.367-379.
(1)Charles C.Moskos and John Sibley Butler,All That We Can Be:Black Leadership and Racial Integration in the Army Way,New York:Basic Books,1996;Warren L.Young,Minorities and the Military:A Cross-National Study in World,New York:Greenwood Press,1982.
(2)David Schoenbaum,Hitler’s Social Revolution:Class and Status in Nazi Germany,London:Weidenfels and Nicolson,1967.
(3)Roland Beénabou and Efe A.Ok,“Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution:The POUM Hypothesis,”The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.116,No.1,2001,pp.447-487.
(4)Alexandru Cojocaru,“Prospects of Upward Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution:Evidence from the Life in Transition Survey,”European Journal of Political Economy,Vol.34,2014,pp.300-314.
(1)John Stuart Mill,Considerations on Representative Government,London:Parker,Son&Bourn,1861.
(2)Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,Taxing the Rich:A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe,p.157.
(1)Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,“The Conscription of Wealth:Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation,”International Organization,Vol.64,No.4,2010,pp.529-561;Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,“Democracy,War,and Wealth:Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation,”American Political Science Review,Vol.106,No.1,2012,pp.81-102.
(1)Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,Taxing the Rich:A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe,2016.
(2)http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/national-material-capabilities-v4-0,访问时间:2018年5月20日。
(3)Paolo Mauro,et al.,A Modern History of Fiscal Prudence and Profligacy,Washington,D.C.:International Monetary Fund,2013.
(4)Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten Van Zanden,“The Maddison Project:Collaborative Research on Historical National Accounts,”Economic History Review,Vol.67,No.3,2014,pp.627-651.
(5)http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html,访问时间:2018年5月20日。
(6)S.Ali Abbas,et al.,A Historical Public Debt Database,Washington,D.C.:International Monetary Fund,2010.
(7)Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,“The Conscription of Wealth:Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation,”pp.529-561;Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,“Democracy,War,and Wealth:Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation,”pp.81-102.
(1)Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N.Katz,“What to Do(and Not to Do)with Time-Series Cross-Section Data,”American Political Science Review,Vol.89,No.3,1995,pp.634-647.
(2)John C.Driscoll and Aart C.Kraay,“Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with Spatially Dependent Panel Data,”Review of Economics and Statistics,Vol.80,No.4,1998,pp.549-560.
(3)Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,“The Conscription of Wealth:Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation”,pp.529-561;Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,“Democracy,War,and Wealth:Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation,”pp.81-102.
(4)Meredieth Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman,Resort to War:1816-2007,Correlates of War,Washington,D.C.:CQ Press,2010.
(1)John J.Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,2001.
(1)参见Thomas Piketty,Capital in the Twenty-First Century,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2014。皮凯蒂将这段不平等发展历程中的“反常”时期归因于两次世界大战对物质资本的毁灭。然而这一解释无法让人信服。的确,世界大战会对物质资本造成极大破坏,但二战后的迅速重建让欧洲和北美主要国家在20世纪50年代末就已恢复至战前的经济水平,从而大量补充了战争中遭受破坏的物质资本。在这种情况下,我们很难相信资本在之后长达20年的时间里仍无法重拾之前的优势地位,反而会让社会的平等趋势持续了20年。因此,要解释西方社会平等历程的“辉煌年代(Trente Glorieuses)”,在皮凯蒂强调的物质资本之外,我们需要关注福利国家以及与其密切相关的收入再分配政策。事实上,皮凯蒂对战争塑造不平等的作用的关注是正确的,但他的错误之处在于误认为战争是通过影响物质资本存量来影响社会不平等的程度。事实上,战争之所以会对不平等产生影响,是因为其塑造了福利国家及其强有力的再分配。
(1)该平均值由笔者基于分国别数据计算得到,数据来自Thomas Piketty,Capital in the Twenty-First Century,2014.网络附录,http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c2,访问时间:2018年5月6日。
(2)肯尼思·华尔兹在三个意象的基础上重点关注国际体系/结构对单元的决定作用,由此形成结构现实主义。这种体系层次的分析还影响了自由主义和其后的建构主义。后来对结构现实主义的批判主要集中在两个方面:一是理论层面,批评其忽略了单元的作用以及单元结构对自身行为模式的影响;二是现实层面,批评其无法解释冷战和平结束这样重大的国际结构转变。前者参见James E.Dougherty and Robert L.Pfaltzgraff,Jr.,Contending Theories of International Relations:A Comprehensive Survey,London:Longman,2000,pp.85-87;后者参见Jeffrey W.Legro and Andrew Moravcsik,“Is Anybody Still a Realist?”International Security,Vol.24,No.2,1999,pp.5-55;Fareed Zakaria,“Is Realism Finished?”National Interest,Vol.30,1992,pp.21-32;Ethan B.Kapstein,“Is Realism Dead?The Domestic Sources of International Politics,”International Organization,Vol.49,No.4,1995,pp.751-774。冷战终结和全球化的双重冲击使得现实主义内部也开始反思体系决定论,由此产生了融合国内政治结构的新古典现实主义(neo-classical realism)。
(3)尽管许多学者对政治科学的研究层次进行了不同划分,但总的来说都能和肯尼思·华尔兹的三层次契合。参见Kenneth N.Waltz,Man,the State and War,pp.600-608;J.David Singer,“The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,”World Politics,Vol.14,No.1,1961,pp.77-92;James Rosenau,The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy,London:Frances Printer,1980,pp.115-169;Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr,World Politics:A Menu for Choice,New York:W.H.Freeman,1992,pp.11-17。
(4)吴其胜在文章中将广义的跨层次分析分为四种模式,分别是“国内因素如何造成了国际后果的‘第二意象’,国际体系因素如何影响国内政治的‘反转第二意象’,将国内政治作为国际体系影响国家行为的中间变量的顺时分析,以及同时用国内和国际政治压力解释国际现象的共时分析”。参见吴其胜:《国际关系研究中的跨层次分析》,载《外交评论》,2008年第1期,第88-97页。
(5)Peter Gourevitch,“The Second Image Reversed:The International Sources of Domestic Politics,”International Organization,Vol.32,No.4,1978,pp.881-912.
(1)Judith Kelley,“International Actors on the Domestic Scene:Membership Conditionality and Socialization by International Institutions,”International Organization,Vol.58,No.3,2004,pp.425-457;Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore,“Complex Global Governance and Domestic Policies:Four Pathways of Influence,”International Affairs,Vol.88,No.3,2012,pp.585-604;Xun Cao,“Global Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence:A Network Explanation of Policy Changes,”World Politics,Vol.64,No.3,2012,pp.375-425.
(2)Joseph M.Grieco,et al.,“Let’s Get a Second Opinion:International Institutions and American Public Support for War,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.55,No.2,2011,pp.563-583;Courtenay R.Conrad and Emily Hencken Ritter,“Treaties,Tenure,and Torture:The Conflicting Domestic Effects of International Law,”Journal of Politics,Vol.75,No.2,2013,pp.397-409;田野:《国际制度对国内政治的影响机制---来自理性选择制度主义的解释》,载《世界经济与政治》,2011年第1期,第5-24页。
(3)根据罗伯特·基欧汉的定义,国际制度包括基于明确协议和目的建立的国际组织,建立在国家认可基础上、涉及特定问题的明确规则的国际机制(包括国际法)以及国际惯例。这一部分文献参见Andrew P.Cortell and James W.Davis,Jr.,“Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms:A Research Agenda,”International Studies Review,Vol.2,No.1,2000,pp.65-87;Jon C.Pevehouse,“Democracy from the Outside-In?International Organizations and Democratization,”International Organization,Vol.56,No.3,2002,pp.515-549;Alexandru Grigorescu,“International Organizations and Government Transparency:Linking the International and Domestic Realms,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.47,No.4,2003,pp.643-667;Songying Fang,“The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.52,No.2,2008,pp.304-321;Leonardo Baccini and Johannes Urpelainen,“Before Ratification:Understanding the Timing of International Treaty Effects on Domestic Policies,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.58,No.1,2013,pp.29-43;田野:《国际制度对国内政治的影响机制---来自理性选择制度主义的解释》,载《世界经济与政治》,2011年第1期,第5-24页。
(4)Brian Burgoon,“Globalization and Welfare Compensation:Disentangling the Ties That Bind,”International Organization,Vol.55,No.3,2001,pp.509-551;Nita Rudra,“Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World,”American Journal of Political Science,Vol.49,No.4,2010,pp.704-730;Mark Andreas Kayser,“How Domestic Is Domestic Politics?Globalization and Elections,”Annual Review of Political Science,Vol.10,No.1,2007,pp.341-362;Steven Bernstein and Benjamin Cashore,“Complex Global Governance and Domestic Policies:Four Pathways of Influence,”pp.585-604.
(5)Clayton L.Thyne,“Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences:The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.50,No.6,2006,pp.937-961;Indridi H.Indridason,“Does Terrorism Influence Domestic Politics?Coalition Formation and Terrorist Incidents,”Journal of Peace Research,Vol.45,No.2,2008,pp.241-259;Douglas M.Gibler,“Outside-In:The Effects of External Threat on State Centralization,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol.54,No.4,2010,pp.519-542;王凯:《国家间战争与国内族群冲突》,载《世界经济与政治》,2018年第2期,第71-96页。
(6)Susan D.Hyde,“The Observer Effect in International Politics:Evidence from a Natural Experiment,”World Politics,Vol.60,No.1,2007,pp.37-63;Mark Andreas Kayser,“How Domestic Is Domestic Politics?Globalization and Elections,”pp.341-362.
(1)Jon C.Pevehouse,“Democracy from the Outside-In?International Organizations and Democratization,”pp.515-549;Alexandru Grigorescu,“International Organizations and Government Transparency:Linking the International and Domestic Realms,”pp.643-667;Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D.Ward,“Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization,”International Organization,Vol.60,No.4,2006,pp.911-933;Nita Rudra,“Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World,”pp.704-730.
(2)Rajat Ganguly and Raymond Taras,Understanding Ethnic Conflict:The International Dimension,New York:Longman,2002;Clayton L.Thyne,“Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences:The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War,”pp.937-961;Jeffrey T.Checkel,ed.,Transnational Dynamics of Civil War,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2013;王凯:《国家间战争与国内族群冲突》,载《世界经济与政治》,2018年第2期,第71-96页。
(3)约书亚·科兹认为,近些年对微观基础的关注超越了在方法论和认识论上的隔阂,理性主义的舆情实验和建构主义、批判理论都关注微观因素的作用。前者包括Joshua D.Kertzer and Kathleen M.McG raw,“Folk Realism:Testing the Microfoundations of Realism in Ordinary Citizens,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.56,No.2,2012,pp.245-258;Michael Tomz and Jessica L.Weeks,“Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace,”American Political Science Review,Vol.107,No.4,2013,pp.849-865;A.Burcu Bayram,“What Drives Modern Diogenes?Individual Values and Cosmopolitan Allegiance,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.21,No.2,2015,pp.451-479;Jonathan Renshon,“Losing Face and Sinking Costs:Experimental Evidence on the Judgment of Political and Military Leaders,”International Organization,Vol.69,No.3,2015,pp.659-695。后者包括Ted Hopf,“The Logic of Habit in International Relations,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.16,No.4,2010,pp.539-561;Todd H.Hall and Andrew A.G.Ross,“Affective Politics After 9/11,”International Organization,Vol.69,No.4,2015,pp.847-879;Ty Solomon and Brent J.Steele,“Micro-Moves in International Relations Theory,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.23,No.2,2017,pp.267-291。科兹的文章参见Joshua D.Kertzer,“Microfoundations in International Relations,”Conflict Management and Peace Science,Vol.34,No.1,2017,pp.81-97。
(1)Songying Fang,“The Informational Role of International Institutions and Domestic Politics,”pp.304-321;Kishore Gawande,Pravin Krishna and Marcelo Olarreaga,“What Governments Maximize and Why:The View from Trade,”International Organization,Vol.63,No.3,2009,pp.491-531;Thomas Gehring and Sebastian Oberthür,“The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction Between International Institutions,”European Journal of International Relations,Vol.15,No.1,2009,pp.125-126;Robert W.Rauchhaus,“Principal-Agent Problems in Humanitarian Intervention:Moral Hazards,Adverse Selection,and the Commitment Dilemma,”International Studies Quarterly,Vol.53,No.4,2009,pp.871-884.
(2)Gsta Esping-Andersen,The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,Cambridge:Polity Press,1990;Walter Korpi,The Democratic Cass Struggle,London:Routledge,1983.
(3)例如,戈斯塔·艾斯平-安德森指出:“由于其既收税又花钱,因此福利国家在定义上就是再分配性的。”参见Gsta Esping-Andersen and J.Miles,“Economic Inequality and the Welfare State,”in Wiemer Salverda,Brian Nolan and Timothy M.Smeeding,eds.,The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality,Oxford,New York:Oxford University Press,2009,pp.639-664。因此,收入所得税的边际税率能够最直接地从税收角度揭示福利国家的再分配本质。至于支出角度,由于不同福利支出项目的再分配性质其实差异极大(例如,公立教育是在贫富阶层之间进行再分配,而失业保险是在就业人口和失业人口之间进行再分配,公共养老金的再分配则常常是在代际之间进行),因此不同福利支出项目的简单加总无法准确刻画作为福利国家本质的再分配的力度。出于这一原因,本文选择从税收角度用收入所得税的边际税率来衡量福利国家的本质。
(4)本文涵盖的国家包括:澳大利亚、奥地利、比利时、加拿大、丹麦、芬兰、法国、德国、爱尔兰、意大利、日本、荷兰、新西兰、挪威、西班牙、瑞典、瑞士、英国和美国。
(1)Federica Genovese,Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,Comparative Income Taxation Database,California:Stanford University Libraries,2016;Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,Taxing the Rich:A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe,Princeton and New York:Princeton University Press and Russell Sage Foundation,2016.
(2)John J.Mearsheimer,The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,New York:W.W.Norton&Company,2001.
(3)Karl Polanyi,The Great Transformation:The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time,New York:Rinehart,1944.
(1)Edward H.Carr,The Twenty Years’Crisis,1919-1939,An Introduction to the Study of International Relations,London:Palgrave Macmillan,1939.
(1)Charles Tilly,Coercion,Capital and European States,AD 990-1992,Cambridge:Wiley-Blackwell,1990.
(2)Perry Anderson,Lineages of the Absolutist State,London:Verso Books,1974;Michael Mann,The Sources of Social Power:Volume 2,the Rise of Classes and Nation States 1760-1914,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1993;Richard Morris Titmuss,Problems of Social Policy,London:Kraus,1950.
(3)Victoria Tin-bor Hui,War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2005.
(4)Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme,“New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization:Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries,1975-95,”American Political Science Review,Vol.97,No.3,2003,pp.425-446;William W.Olney,“A Race to the Bottom?Employment Protection and Foreign Direct Investment,”Journal of International Economics,Vol.91,No.2,2013,pp.191-203;Harold L.Wilensky and Charles N.Lebeaux,Industrial Society and Social Welfare,New York:Russell Sage Foundation,1958.
(1)Karl Polanyi,The Great Transformation:The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time,1944.
(2)Andreas Wimmer,“War,”Annual Review of Sociology,Vol.40,No.1,2014,pp.173-197.
(3)Herbert Obinger and Klaus Petersen,“Mass Warfare and the Welfare State:Causal Mechanisms and Effects,”British Journal of Political Science,Vol.47,No.1,2017,pp.203-227.
(4)Richard Morris Titmuss,Problems of Social Policy,1950.
(1)Charles Tilly,Coercion,Capital and European States,AD 990-1992,1990.
(2)Perry Anderson,Lineages of the Absolutist State,1974.
(3)Michael Mann,The Sources of Social Power:Volume 2,the Rise of Classes and Nation States 1760-1914,1993.
(1)Thomas H.Marshall,Citizenship and Social Class,and Other Essays,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1950.
(2)Harold L.Wilensky,The Welfare State and Equality,Oakland:University of California Press,1975;Harold L.Wilensky and Charles N.Lebeaux,Industrial Society and Social Welfare,1958.
(3)David Brady,Jason Beckfield and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser,“Economic Globalization and the Welfare State in Affluent Democracies,1975-2001,”American Sociological Review,Vol.70,No.6,2005,pp.921-948.
(1)Walter Korp,i“Power Resources and Employer:Centered Approaches in Explanations of Welfare States and Varieties of Capitalism:Protagonists,Consenters,and Antagonists,”World Politics,Vol.58,No.2,2006,pp.167-206;Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme,“New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and Globalization:Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries,1975-95,”pp.425-446.
(1)虽然人类历史上不乏普通平民受征召成为作战人员的实例(如14世纪的英法百年战争时的英格兰长弓兵),但西方真正以全民族作为军事动员对象的大众军队诞生于法国大革命战争(French Revolutionary Wars)之中。1793年1月路易十六被处死之后,普鲁士、奥地利、西班牙和英国等多国组成第一次反法联盟,向法国发动猛攻。四处作战的法国革命军捉襟见肘,遭受重大损失。共和国危在旦夕之际,革命急需补充兵源并扩大军队规模。于是1793年8月23日,国民议会发布大规模征兵公告(levée en masse),要求“从此刻开始,直至共和国的敌人被驱赶出这块土地,所有的法国人都要响应军队的征用要求”。所有18岁至25岁的身体健全的未婚男子都被立即征召进入军队。公告发出仅仅一年,法国革命军的总人数就从1793年年初的30万人激增至1794年9月的150万人。这支军队在拿破仑·波拿巴(Napoleon Bonaparte)和安德烈·马塞纳(AndréMasséna)等优秀将领的率领下,凭借着众多的人数和高昂的革命热情,不仅成功地将外国势力赶出法国,还在周边建立了许多姐妹共和国。这一过程不仅传播了大革命的精神,更将“公民军队”这种全新的战争组织模式带到了全欧洲,引起欧洲列强的震动和效仿。这种效仿常常遵循“竞争-模仿”的社会学习机制,即被公民军队威胁特别是击败的国家往往会在战后引入类似的全民兵役制(mass conscription)。拿破仑战争中被法军击溃并占领的普鲁士是拿破仑战争后法国全民兵役制的第一个模仿者,也是19世纪这一制度最坚定的贯彻者。其从1815年起就要求所有成年男性必须要服2年现役、5年预备役以及11年民兵役。现代世界最杰出的军事思想家、曾经做过拿破仑战俘的普鲁士人卡尔·冯·克劳塞维茨(Carl Von Clausewitz)更是将自己的毕生精力奉献给对大规模平民战争的思考,思考的结晶就是《战争论》。1864年至1871年间,普鲁士将对平民的大规模动员与当时最先进的后勤运输技术---铁路结合起来,接连击败丹麦、奥地利和法国,直接迫使奥地利于1868年建立全民兵役制,迫使法国于1873年重拾曾经在拿破仑战争后被迫放弃的全民征兵。丹麦为应对之前就积极备战的普鲁士,早在1848年就推行了全民兵役。其对普鲁士战争的失败促使芬兰(1870年)、瑞典(1882年)和挪威(1905年)这些北欧国家先后建立了全民兵役制。即便是没有很强陆军动员传统的岛国---英国也在第一次世界大战的压力下于1916年实现了全民征兵。参见John Keegan,A History of Warfare,London:Vintage Books,1993。
(1)James J.Sheehan,Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?The Transformation of Modern Europe,London:Mariner Books,2009.
(2)Hans Joas and Wolfgang Kn9bl,Kriegsverdrngung:ein Problem in der Geschichte der Sozialtheorie,Frankfurt am Main:Suhrkamp,2008.
(3)Samuel E.Finer,The History of Government from the Earliest Times:Ancient Monarchies and Empires,New York:Oxford University Press,1997.
(1)Matthew Stavros,“Military Revolution in Early Modern Japan,”Japanese Studies,Vol.33,No.3,2013,pp.243-261.
(2)Ernest Barker,The Politics of Aristotle,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1948.
(3)Samuel E.Finer,The History of Government from the Earliest Times:Ancient Monarchies and Empires,p.17.
(1)Frank Jacob and Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo,The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe:A Revision,London:Springer,2016.
(2)Michael Mann,“The Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism,”New Left Review,Vol.162,1987,pp.35-50.
(3)Thomas H.Marshall,Citizenship and Social Class,and Other Essays,1950.
(1)Samuel P.Huntington,The Soldier and the State,Cambridge:Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1957.
(2)在前现代社会中,我们也可以看到国家通过提高下层人民的社会地位来补偿其对军事活动的参与。例如,中国战国时期商鞅在秦国创立的二十级军功爵位制,规定包括秦国宗室在内的秦国人民一律按照军功大小授予从公士到彻侯的二十等爵位,待遇(田宅、仆人、服役负担甚至饭食标准)随爵位的上升而提高。这是一种直接以社会地位的提高鼓励和回报民众参军的制度。虽然存在以上历史实例,但受限于军队的阶级结构尚未完全下移以及民众缺乏政治权利,国家使用社会地位补偿战争参与的情况并不普遍。
(3)Chulhee Lee,“Military Positions and Post-Service Occupational Mobility of Union Army Veterans,1861-1880,”Explorations in Economic History,Vol.44,No.4,2007,pp.680-698;Chulhee Lee,“Military Service and Economic Mobility:Evidence from the American Civil War,”Explorations in Economic History,Vol.49,No.3,2012,pp.367-379.
(1)Charles C.Moskos and John Sibley Butler,All That We Can Be:Black Leadership and Racial Integration in the Army Way,New York:Basic Books,1996;Warren L.Young,Minorities and the Military:A Cross-National Study in World,New York:Greenwood Press,1982.
(2)David Schoenbaum,Hitler’s Social Revolution:Class and Status in Nazi Germany,London:Weidenfels and Nicolson,1967.
(3)Roland Beénabou and Efe A.Ok,“Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution:The POUM Hypothesis,”The Quarterly Journal of Economics,Vol.116,No.1,2001,pp.447-487.
(4)Alexandru Cojocaru,“Prospects of Upward Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution:Evidence from the Life in Transition Survey,”European Journal of Political Economy,Vol.34,2014,pp.300-314.
(1)John Stuart Mill,Considerations on Representative Government,London:Parker,Son&Bourn,1861.
(2)Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,Taxing the Rich:A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe,p.157.
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(1)Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage,Taxing the Rich:A History of Fiscal Fairness in the United States and Europe,2016.
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(1)参见Thomas Piketty,Capital in the Twenty-First Century,Cambridge:Harvard University Press,2014。皮凯蒂将这段不平等发展历程中的“反常”时期归因于两次世界大战对物质资本的毁灭。然而这一解释无法让人信服。的确,世界大战会对物质资本造成极大破坏,但二战后的迅速重建让欧洲和北美主要国家在20世纪50年代末就已恢复至战前的经济水平,从而大量补充了战争中遭受破坏的物质资本。在这种情况下,我们很难相信资本在之后长达20年的时间里仍无法重拾之前的优势地位,反而会让社会的平等趋势持续了20年。因此,要解释西方社会平等历程的“辉煌年代(Trente Glorieuses)”,在皮凯蒂强调的物质资本之外,我们需要关注福利国家以及与其密切相关的收入再分配政策。事实上,皮凯蒂对战争塑造不平等的作用的关注是正确的,但他的错误之处在于误认为战争是通过影响物质资本存量来影响社会不平等的程度。事实上,战争之所以会对不平等产生影响,是因为其塑造了福利国家及其强有力的再分配。
(1)该平均值由笔者基于分国别数据计算得到,数据来自Thomas Piketty,Capital in the Twenty-First Century,2014.网络附录,http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c2,访问时间:2018年5月6日。