交易所一线监管能甄别资本市场风险吗?——基于年报问询函的证据
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摘要
强化交易所一线监管作用是近年来中国资本市场监管补短板的重要举措。文章基于年报问询函,深入探究了交易所对中国上市公司的盈余管理行为是否具有风险甄别能力。结果显示:首先,企业的应计盈余管理程度越高,收到问询函的概率越高,而且在收到年报问询函的企业样本中,问询函的精确性和准确性也越高,这反映了问询函具有精准识别的功能;其次,对于非国有企业、深交所上市公司,以及媒体关注度较高、所处法制环境较好的企业,问询函对盈余管理的识别效果更加明显;最后,问询函同样能够甄别相对隐蔽的真实盈余管理,并通过影响企业未来的会计绩效而使真实价值回归。文章为中国现阶段监管方式创新性转型的实施效果提供了经验证据。
The corporate earnings management behavior will reduce the efficiency of capital market pricing,resulting in the accumulation of "bubbles",which is an important factor influencing risk hazards. In recent years,strengthening the front-line supervision of the exchange is an important action for China's capital market to fill shortcomings. Therefore,it is of great significance to explore whether the front-line supervision of the exchange can identify the corporate earnings management behavior and to verify its active prevention and mitigation of risks.Based on the evidence of the annual report inquiry letter,this study uses Heckman's two-stage approach to further explore whether the exchange has the "whistleblower" risk screening ability on listed companies' earnings management behavior. The results of the study show that:First,the higher the corporate accrued earnings management level is,the higher the probability of acceptance of the inquiry letter is,and in the sample of companies receiving the annual report inquiry letter,the higher the higher the accuracy of the inquiry letter is,which shows that the inquiry letter has a precise recognition function. Second,the cross-section grouping finds that the inquiry letter identifies more obviously in non-state-owned companies,Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies,and the media's earnings management with high degree of concern and good legal environment. Third,the scalability test finds that the inquiry letter also has a screening effect on the relatively hidden real earnings management,and the inquiry letter mainly plays the role of reducing market information asymmetry by reducing companies' future accounting performance for positive earnings management.This paper has the following contributions:First,the existing domestic literature mainly explores the economic consequences of the inquiry letter from the aspects of market reaction,audit quality,stock price crash risk and earnings management,but has not yet begun to pay attention to the influencing factors of the inquiry letter. Different from Chen,et al.(2019),whether the inquiry letter can reduce the future earnings management behavior from the perspective of economic consequences,this paper mainly studies whether the current corporate earnings management can trigger the identification and supervision of the exchange annual inquiry letter from the perspective of influencing factors. The risk identification function of the inspection inquiry letter is precisely the important premise of the exchange's governance role. It enriches and supplements the research on the effectiveness of the front-line supervision of the exchange by Chen,et al.(2019),and also expands the study perspective of the domestic inquiry letter to a certain extent. According to the literature that the author has mastered,the existing research on the influencing factors of the inquiry letter abroad is mainly based on profitability,audit quality,corporate governance,tax evasion,political connections,etc. However,it has not yet paid attention to whether the corporate earnings management behavior can be accurately identified by the inquiry letter,which enriches the research on the influencing factors of the inquiry letter to a certain extent. Second,the existing literature mainly focuses on the impact of earnings management from the perspective of banks,firms and auditors,but lacks the perspective of public law enforcement to explore the economic consequences of earnings management. As a front-line of supervision,whether the exchange is sensitive to earnings management is of great significance to prevent the occurrence of risks. Third,different from the SEC comment letter in US,the main body of the Chinese inquiry letter is mainly a lower-level exchange. Exploring the effectiveness of the inquiry letter with Chinese characteristics can complement the literature in this field. It is also a test of the effect of the "deepening the reform of the regulatory system" of the 19 th National Congress and the reform of the information disclosure through the train policy in 2013.
The corporate earnings management behavior will reduce the efficiency of capital market pricing,resulting in the accumulation of "bubbles",which is an important factor influencing risk hazards. In recent years,strengthening the front-line supervision of the exchange is an important action for China's capital market to fill shortcomings. Therefore,it is of great significance to explore whether the front-line supervision of the exchange can identify the corporate earnings management behavior and to verify its active prevention and mitigation of risks.Based on the evidence of the annual report inquiry letter,this study uses Heckman's two-stage approach to further explore whether the exchange has the "whistleblower" risk screening ability on listed companies' earnings management behavior. The results of the study show that:First,the higher the corporate accrued earnings management level is,the higher the probability of acceptance of the inquiry letter is,and in the sample of companies receiving the annual report inquiry letter,the higher the higher the accuracy of the inquiry letter is,which shows that the inquiry letter has a precise recognition function. Second,the cross-section grouping finds that the inquiry letter identifies more obviously in non-state-owned companies,Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies,and the media's earnings management with high degree of concern and good legal environment. Third,the scalability test finds that the inquiry letter also has a screening effect on the relatively hidden real earnings management,and the inquiry letter mainly plays the role of reducing market information asymmetry by reducing companies' future accounting performance for positive earnings management.This paper has the following contributions:First,the existing domestic literature mainly explores the economic consequences of the inquiry letter from the aspects of market reaction,audit quality,stock price crash risk and earnings management,but has not yet begun to pay attention to the influencing factors of the inquiry letter. Different from Chen,et al.(2019),whether the inquiry letter can reduce the future earnings management behavior from the perspective of economic consequences,this paper mainly studies whether the current corporate earnings management can trigger the identification and supervision of the exchange annual inquiry letter from the perspective of influencing factors. The risk identification function of the inspection inquiry letter is precisely the important premise of the exchange's governance role. It enriches and supplements the research on the effectiveness of the front-line supervision of the exchange by Chen,et al.(2019),and also expands the study perspective of the domestic inquiry letter to a certain extent. According to the literature that the author has mastered,the existing research on the influencing factors of the inquiry letter abroad is mainly based on profitability,audit quality,corporate governance,tax evasion,political connections,etc. However,it has not yet paid attention to whether the corporate earnings management behavior can be accurately identified by the inquiry letter,which enriches the research on the influencing factors of the inquiry letter to a certain extent. Second,the existing literature mainly focuses on the impact of earnings management from the perspective of banks,firms and auditors,but lacks the perspective of public law enforcement to explore the economic consequences of earnings management. As a front-line of supervision,whether the exchange is sensitive to earnings management is of great significance to prevent the occurrence of risks. Third,different from the SEC comment letter in US,the main body of the Chinese inquiry letter is mainly a lower-level exchange. Exploring the effectiveness of the inquiry letter with Chinese characteristics can complement the literature in this field. It is also a test of the effect of the "deepening the reform of the regulatory system" of the 19 th National Congress and the reform of the information disclosure through the train policy in 2013.
引文
[1]陈运森,邓祎璐,李哲.非处罚性监管具有信息含量吗?-基于问询函的证据[J].金融研究,2018a,(4):155-171.
[2]陈运森,邓祎璐,李哲.非行政处罚性监管能改进审计质量吗?-基于财务报告问询函的证据[J].审计研究,2018b,(5):82-88.
[3]陈运森,邓祎璐,李哲.证券交易所一线监管的有效性研究:基于财务报告问询函的证据[J].管理世界,2019,(3):169-185.
[4]黄梅,夏新平.操纵性应计利润模型检测盈余管理能力的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2009,(5):136-143.
[5]黎文靖.会计信息披露政府监管的经济后果-来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2007,(8):13-21.
[6]李延喜,包世泽,高锐,等.薪酬激励、董事会监管与上市公司盈余管理[J].南开管理评论,2007,(6):55-61.
[7]林大庞,苏冬蔚.股权激励与公司业绩-基于盈余管理视角的新研究[J].金融研究,2011,(9):162-177.
[8]陆正飞,祝继高,孙便霞.盈余管理、会计信息与银行债务契约[J].管理世界,2008,(3):152-158.
[9]宋云玲,李志文,纪新伟.从业绩预告违规看中国证券监管的处罚效果[J].金融研究,2011,(6):136-149.
[10]孙光国,郭睿. CFO内部董事有助于董事会履行监督职能吗?[J].会计研究,2015,(11):27-33.
[11]王兵,李晶,苏文兵,等.行政处罚能改进审计质量吗?-基于中国证监会处罚的证据[J].会计研究,2011,(12):86-92.
[12]王福胜,吉姗姗,程富.盈余管理对上市公司未来经营业绩的影响研究-基于应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理比较视角[J].南开管理评论,2014,(2):95-106.
[13]王克敏,廉鹏.保荐制度改善首发上市公司盈余质量了吗?[J].管理世界,2010,(8):21-34.
[14]叶康涛,刘行.税收征管、所得税成本与盈余管理[J].管理世界,2011,(5):140-148.
[15]张俊生,汤晓建,李广众.预防性监管能够抑制股价崩盘风险吗?-基于交易所年报问询函的研究[J].管理科学学报,2018,(10):112-126.
[16]曾雪云,陆正飞.盈余管理信息风险、业绩波动与审计意见-投资者如何逃离有重大盈余管理嫌疑的上市公司?[J].财经研究,2016,(8):133-144.
[17]Anderson D M. Taking stock in China:Company disclosure and information in China’s stock markets[J]. Georgetown Law Journal,2000,88:1919-1952.
[18]Cassell C A,Dreher L M,Myers L A. Reviewing the SEC’s review process:10-K comment letters and the cost of remediation[J]. The Accounting Review,2013,88(6):1875-1908.
[19]Chen G M,Firth M,Gao D N,et al. Is China’s securities regulatory agency a toothless tiger?Evidence from enforcement actions[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2005,24(6):451-488.
[20]Chen K C W,Yuan H Q. Earnings management and capital resource allocation:Evidence from China’s accounting-based regulation of rights issues[J]. The Accounting Review,2004,79(3):645-665.
[21]Cohen D A,Zarowin P. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(1):2-19.
[22]Cunningham L M,Johnson B A,Johnson E S,et al. The switch up:An examination of changes in earnings management after receiving SEC comment letters[R]. SSEP Working Paper,2019.
[23]Dechow P M,Sloan R G,Sweeney A P. Detecting earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193-225.
[24]Graham J R, Harvey C R, Rajgopal S. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(1-3):3-73.
[25]Griffin P A. Got information?Investor response to form 10-K and form 10-Q EDGAR filings[J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2003,8(4):433-460.
[26]Haw I M,Qi D Q,Wu Do H,et al. Market consequences of earnings management in response to security regulations in China[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2005,22(1):95-140.
[27]Healy P M,Wahlen J M. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting[J].Accounting Horizons,1999,13(4):365-383.
[28]Heckman J J. Sample selection bias as a specification error[J]. Econometrica,1979,47(1):153-161.
[29]Heese J,Khan M,Ramanna K. Is the SEC captured?Evidence from comment-letter reviews[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2017,64(1):98-122.
[30]Johnston R, Petacchi R. Regulatory oversight of financial reporting:Securities and exchange commission comment letters[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2017,34(2):1128-1155.
[31]Jones J J. Earnings management during import relief investigations[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(2):193-228.
[32]King G,Zeng L C. Logistic regression in rare events data[J]. Political Analysis,2001,9(2):137-163.
[33]Kothari S P. Capital markets research in accounting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2001, 31(1-3):105-231.
[34]Kothari S P,Leone A J,Wasley C E. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39(1):163-197.
[35]Kubick T R,Lynch D P,Mayberry M A,et al. The effects of regulatory scrutiny on tax avoidance:An examination of SEC comment letters[J]. The Accounting Review,2016,91(6):1751-1780.
[36]Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42(3):335-370.
(1)证监会也有类似函件,但所涉及的内容一般比较严重,属于违法违规性质。而交易所函件大多尚未定性,包括监管函、关注函和问询函。监管函和关注函大多属于交易所的被动行为,一般是媒体或投资者先发现问题,而后发出函件;问询函大多是交易所发现信息披露瑕疵或者存疑,要求公司进一步披露,属于交易所的主动行为。
(1)参见中国证券网:“迟迟不回复的年报问询函”(http://news.cnstock.com/paper,2017-06-01,832889.htm)。
(1)如“收入”“毛利”“现金”“关联”“减值”“计提”“应收”“预收”“费用”“递延”“利润”“损益”“预付”“应付”等常见的会计用词。
(1)由于部分问询函和回函内容缺失,如问询函内容仅有标题、问询无回函或者有回函但没有注明回复时间,在假设检验时予以剔除,导致样本量少于被问询的公司数448,但这不影响实证检验结果。
(1)限于篇幅,文中未列出稳健性检验与异质性分析结果,备索。
[2]陈运森,邓祎璐,李哲.非行政处罚性监管能改进审计质量吗?-基于财务报告问询函的证据[J].审计研究,2018b,(5):82-88.
[3]陈运森,邓祎璐,李哲.证券交易所一线监管的有效性研究:基于财务报告问询函的证据[J].管理世界,2019,(3):169-185.
[4]黄梅,夏新平.操纵性应计利润模型检测盈余管理能力的实证分析[J].南开管理评论,2009,(5):136-143.
[5]黎文靖.会计信息披露政府监管的经济后果-来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].会计研究,2007,(8):13-21.
[6]李延喜,包世泽,高锐,等.薪酬激励、董事会监管与上市公司盈余管理[J].南开管理评论,2007,(6):55-61.
[7]林大庞,苏冬蔚.股权激励与公司业绩-基于盈余管理视角的新研究[J].金融研究,2011,(9):162-177.
[8]陆正飞,祝继高,孙便霞.盈余管理、会计信息与银行债务契约[J].管理世界,2008,(3):152-158.
[9]宋云玲,李志文,纪新伟.从业绩预告违规看中国证券监管的处罚效果[J].金融研究,2011,(6):136-149.
[10]孙光国,郭睿. CFO内部董事有助于董事会履行监督职能吗?[J].会计研究,2015,(11):27-33.
[11]王兵,李晶,苏文兵,等.行政处罚能改进审计质量吗?-基于中国证监会处罚的证据[J].会计研究,2011,(12):86-92.
[12]王福胜,吉姗姗,程富.盈余管理对上市公司未来经营业绩的影响研究-基于应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理比较视角[J].南开管理评论,2014,(2):95-106.
[13]王克敏,廉鹏.保荐制度改善首发上市公司盈余质量了吗?[J].管理世界,2010,(8):21-34.
[14]叶康涛,刘行.税收征管、所得税成本与盈余管理[J].管理世界,2011,(5):140-148.
[15]张俊生,汤晓建,李广众.预防性监管能够抑制股价崩盘风险吗?-基于交易所年报问询函的研究[J].管理科学学报,2018,(10):112-126.
[16]曾雪云,陆正飞.盈余管理信息风险、业绩波动与审计意见-投资者如何逃离有重大盈余管理嫌疑的上市公司?[J].财经研究,2016,(8):133-144.
[17]Anderson D M. Taking stock in China:Company disclosure and information in China’s stock markets[J]. Georgetown Law Journal,2000,88:1919-1952.
[18]Cassell C A,Dreher L M,Myers L A. Reviewing the SEC’s review process:10-K comment letters and the cost of remediation[J]. The Accounting Review,2013,88(6):1875-1908.
[19]Chen G M,Firth M,Gao D N,et al. Is China’s securities regulatory agency a toothless tiger?Evidence from enforcement actions[J]. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,2005,24(6):451-488.
[20]Chen K C W,Yuan H Q. Earnings management and capital resource allocation:Evidence from China’s accounting-based regulation of rights issues[J]. The Accounting Review,2004,79(3):645-665.
[21]Cohen D A,Zarowin P. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(1):2-19.
[22]Cunningham L M,Johnson B A,Johnson E S,et al. The switch up:An examination of changes in earnings management after receiving SEC comment letters[R]. SSEP Working Paper,2019.
[23]Dechow P M,Sloan R G,Sweeney A P. Detecting earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review,1995,70(2):193-225.
[24]Graham J R, Harvey C R, Rajgopal S. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(1-3):3-73.
[25]Griffin P A. Got information?Investor response to form 10-K and form 10-Q EDGAR filings[J]. Review of Accounting Studies,2003,8(4):433-460.
[26]Haw I M,Qi D Q,Wu Do H,et al. Market consequences of earnings management in response to security regulations in China[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2005,22(1):95-140.
[27]Healy P M,Wahlen J M. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting[J].Accounting Horizons,1999,13(4):365-383.
[28]Heckman J J. Sample selection bias as a specification error[J]. Econometrica,1979,47(1):153-161.
[29]Heese J,Khan M,Ramanna K. Is the SEC captured?Evidence from comment-letter reviews[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2017,64(1):98-122.
[30]Johnston R, Petacchi R. Regulatory oversight of financial reporting:Securities and exchange commission comment letters[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2017,34(2):1128-1155.
[31]Jones J J. Earnings management during import relief investigations[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1991,29(2):193-228.
[32]King G,Zeng L C. Logistic regression in rare events data[J]. Political Analysis,2001,9(2):137-163.
[33]Kothari S P. Capital markets research in accounting[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2001, 31(1-3):105-231.
[34]Kothari S P,Leone A J,Wasley C E. Performance matched discretionary accrual measures[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,39(1):163-197.
[35]Kubick T R,Lynch D P,Mayberry M A,et al. The effects of regulatory scrutiny on tax avoidance:An examination of SEC comment letters[J]. The Accounting Review,2016,91(6):1751-1780.
[36]Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activities manipulation[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2006,42(3):335-370.
(1)证监会也有类似函件,但所涉及的内容一般比较严重,属于违法违规性质。而交易所函件大多尚未定性,包括监管函、关注函和问询函。监管函和关注函大多属于交易所的被动行为,一般是媒体或投资者先发现问题,而后发出函件;问询函大多是交易所发现信息披露瑕疵或者存疑,要求公司进一步披露,属于交易所的主动行为。
(1)参见中国证券网:“迟迟不回复的年报问询函”(http://news.cnstock.com/paper,2017-06-01,832889.htm)。
(1)如“收入”“毛利”“现金”“关联”“减值”“计提”“应收”“预收”“费用”“递延”“利润”“损益”“预付”“应付”等常见的会计用词。
(1)由于部分问询函和回函内容缺失,如问询函内容仅有标题、问询无回函或者有回函但没有注明回复时间,在假设检验时予以剔除,导致样本量少于被问询的公司数448,但这不影响实证检验结果。
(1)限于篇幅,文中未列出稳健性检验与异质性分析结果,备索。