内部资本市场对企业现金持有与研发投入持续性的影响——基于集团下科技企业样本的经验证据
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摘要
内部资本市场是以集团内行政命令进行资金配置,可作为外部资本市场的有效补充。本文将科技企业嵌入集团组织中,考察集团下科技企业现金持有与研发投入持续性关系的特殊性,以及其中的成因问题。利用系统广义矩估计方法(SGMM)研究发现:(1)一般科技企业现金持有与研发平滑之间存在正向关系;(2)集团组织属性对现金持有与研发平滑的影响存在积极的弱化调节作用,集团下科技企业运用现金持有保持研发平滑的依赖程度降低;(3)内部资本市场的剩余控制权效应与集团股权结构是使集团组织属性对现金持有与研发平滑关系产生弱化调节作用的成因。
Internal capital market uses administrative orders with in the business groups to allocate funds, effectively supplementing the external capital market. Base on the generalized method of moments(GMM),the influence of internal capital market on the sustainability of R&D investment in high-tech companiesis explored in this thesis. The main conclusions are as follows:(1) There is a positive relationship between cash holdings and R&D smoothing in general high-techcompanies;(2) The organizational attributes of the group have a positive weakening and regulating effect on cash holdings and R&D smoothing, and the dependence on cash holdings to maintain R&D smoothing is reduced in the high-tech companies under business groups;(3) Residual control effect in the internal capital market and equity structure of the business groups are the reasons accounting for the weakening and regulating relationship between cash holdings and R&D smoothing.
Internal capital market uses administrative orders with in the business groups to allocate funds, effectively supplementing the external capital market. Base on the generalized method of moments(GMM),the influence of internal capital market on the sustainability of R&D investment in high-tech companiesis explored in this thesis. The main conclusions are as follows:(1) There is a positive relationship between cash holdings and R&D smoothing in general high-techcompanies;(2) The organizational attributes of the group have a positive weakening and regulating effect on cash holdings and R&D smoothing, and the dependence on cash holdings to maintain R&D smoothing is reduced in the high-tech companies under business groups;(3) Residual control effect in the internal capital market and equity structure of the business groups are the reasons accounting for the weakening and regulating relationship between cash holdings and R&D smoothing.
引文
[1] ALMEIDA H,WEISBACH M S,CAMPELLO M .The cash flow sensitivity of cash[J].The Journal of Finance,2004,59(4):1777-1804.
[2] BROWN J R ,PETERSEN B C .Cash holdings and R&D smoothing[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(3):0-709.
[3] KIM C S,MAUER D C,SHERMAN A E.The Determinants of corporate liquidity:Theory and evidence[J].Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis,1998,33(3):335-359.
[4] STEIN J C.Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources[J].Journal of Finance,2012,52(1):111-133.
[5] PORTA R L,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A.Corporate ownership around the world[J].The Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[6] Bates T W,Kahle K M,RENé M STULZ.Why do U.S.Firms hold so much more cash than they used to?[J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(5):1985-2021.
[7]PEDRO S.R&D smoothing:Revisiting the consensus on the cyclicality of research spending [Z].Working paper,2014.
[8] HARFORD J.Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,1999,54(6):1969-1997.
[9] JENSEN M C.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1999,76(2):323-329.
[10]ORR,MILLEr D.A model of the demand for money by firms[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1966,80(3):413-435.
[11] OPLER T,PINKOWITZ L,RENé STULZ,et al.The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings[J].1999,52(1):3-46.
[12] MYERS S C,RAJAN R G.The paradox of liquidity[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(3):733-771.
[13]吴淑娥,仲伟周,卫剑波,等.融资来源、现金持有与研发平滑:来自我国生物医药制造业的经验证据[J].经济学(季刊),2017(2):745-766.
[14] ALMEIDA H,ACHARYA V V,CAMPELLO M.Is cash negative debt?A hedging perspective on corporate financial policies[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2007,16(4):515-554.
[15]SCHROTH E,SZALAY D.Cash breeds success:The role of financing constraints in patent races[J].Warwick Economics Research Paper,2010,14(1):73-118.
[16]王爱群,唐文萍.环境不确定性对财务柔性与企业成长性关系的影响研究[J].中国软科学,2017(3):186-192
[17] DENIS D J,SIBILKOV V.Financial constraints,investment,and the value of cash holdings[J].Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(1):247-269.
[18] KHANNA T,PALEPU K,UNIVERSITY H.The future of business groups in emerging markets:Long-run evidence from chile[J].Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(3):268-285.
[19] KHANNA T.Business groups and risk sharing around the world[J].Journal of Business,2005,78(1):301-340.
[20] HE J,TIAN X.The dark side of analyst coverage:The case of innovation[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2013,109(3):856-878.
[21] HSIEH T J,YEH R S,CHEN Y J.Business group characteristics and affiliated firm innovation:The case of Taiwan[J].Industrial Marketing Management,2010,39(4):560-570.
[22] SHIN H H,PARK Y S.Financing constraints and internal capital markets:Evidence from korean `chaebols’[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2004,5(2):169-191.
[23]JIA N,SHI J,WANG Y.Coinsurance within business group:Evidence from related party transaction in an emerging market [J].Accepted by Management Science,2013,59(10):2295-2313.
[24] GRANT R M.Contemporary strategy analysis:Concepts,techniques,applications with cases set,6th edition[J].Abstract & Applied Analysis,2015,2015:1-1.
[25] DELOOF M.Belgian intragroup relations and the determinants of corporate liquid reserves[J].European Financial Management,2001,7(3):375-392.
[26] BERGER P G,OFEK E.Diversification’s effect on firm value[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1995,37(1):39-65.
[27] MOTTA M,POLO M.Leniency programs and cartel prosecution[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2003,21(3):347-379.
[28]ALMEIDA H,KIM C,KIM B.Internal capital markets in business groups:Evidence from asian financial crisis [J].The Journal of Finance,2015,70(6):2539-2586.
[29]韩亮亮,李凯.控制权、现金流权与资本结构:一项基于我国民营上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].会计研究,2008(3):66-73.
[30]李增泉,辛显刚,于旭辉.金融发展、债务融资约束与金字塔结构:来自民营企业集团的证据[J].管理世界,2008(1):123-135.
[31] ALMEIDA H V,WOLFENZON D.A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups[J].The Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2637-2680.
[32] BIANCO M,NICODANO G.Pyramidal groups and debt[J].European Economic Review,2006,50(4):937-961.
[33]马忠,陈彦.金字塔结构下最终控制人的盘踞效应与利益协同效应[J].中国软科学,2008(5):91-101.
[34]冯根福,马亚军,姚树洁.中国上市公司担保行为的实证分析[J].中国工业经济.2005(03):13-21.
[35]孟祥展,张俊瑞,程子健.金字塔结构、投资者保护与关联担保:基于控制权和现金流权的分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2015,37(4):11-20.
[36]邵军,刘志远.企业集团内部资本配置的经济后果:来自中国企业集团的证据[J].会计研究,2008(4):47-53.
[37]贺勇,何红渠.民营企业集团、控股股东支持与R&D投资:融资约束情境下的调节作用与中介作用[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2014,35(3):86-98.
[38]BELENZON S,BERKOVITZ T.Innovation in business groups[J].Management Science,2010,56(3):519-535.
[39]刘端,薛静芸,罗勇,等.现金持有、研发投资平滑和产品市场竞争绩效:基于中国高科技行业上市公司的实证[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(5):717-726.
[40] SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[41]陈希晖.关联交易中终极股东利益输送行为研究:基于“结构-动机(S-M)”两视角的分析[D].南京:东南大学,2015.
[42]杨兴全,曾义.现金持有能够平滑企业的研发投入吗?:基于融资约束与金融发展视角的实证研究[J].科研管理,2014,35(7):107-115.
[43] CHUNG K H,PRUITT S W.A simple approximation of tobin\”s q[J].Financial Management,1994,23(3):70.
[44] BROWN J R,FAZZARI S M,PETERSEN B C.Financing innovation and growth:Cash flow,external equity,and the 1990s R&D boom[J].Journal of Finance,2010,64(1):151-185.
[45]BULUNDELL R,BOND S.GMM Estimation with persistent panel data:An application to production function [J].Econometric Reviews,2009,19(3):321-340.
[46]刘雪松,洪正.金融危机、银行授信与企业流动性管理:中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2017(3):128-144.
[47]温军,冯福根.异质机构、企业性质与自主创新[J].经济研究,2012(3):53-64.
[48]瞿华,刘荣荣.中国城镇化对服务业影响的区域差异:基于系统GMM模型的实证研究[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2018,24(2):15-23.
① 控制权表明终极控股股东对成员企业的重大事项的实际决定权,现金流权则是最终控制人享有成员企业收益分配的权利依据。
(1)Schroth E,Szalay D.“Cash Breeds Success:The role of financing constraints in patent races”,Review of Finance,2010,14(1):73-118.
(2)吴淑娥等2016的研究表明,我国企业中接近1/5的账面资产以现金形式存在。由于普遍存在融资约束、利率波动等环境,企业持有现金成本增加。
(3)共同控制权主要包括股权控制、经营性控制以及家族和血缘关系的协调控制(Khanna and Palepu,2000a),但各国的集团企业形成过程和组织形式大有不同,我国相关法规对企业集团的定义为“以资本为主要纽带,两个或两个以上独立企业,组成具有稳定控制和被控制关系的企业法人联合体”。
(4)金字塔控股结构是指终极控股股东通过持有一系列中介层次公司的股权对底层上市公司实施间接控制的多层级、多链条的控制结构。在这种控制结构中,终极控股股东处于金字塔顶端,由它控制第一层级的公司,然后由第一层级的公司控制第二层级的公司,第二层级的公司再控制第三层级的公司,直到控制底层上市公司,并且终极控股股东对底层上市公司的控制权达到了标准临界值(LaPorta,1999;杨兴君,2003;王鹏,2006)。水平控股结构则与之相对,它指在终极控股股东控制一家公司后,进而在同时控制第二家第三家公司,这些公司都处于终极控股东控制下的同一水平。
(5)La Porta等(1999)判断金字塔结构的条件是:①样本公司存在着终极控股股东;②在控制链条上,样本公司及终极控股股东中间至少存在一个由终极控股股东非完全控制的公司;③终极控股股东对样本公司的控制权必须达到20%以上。
(6)Brown and Petersen(2011)使用企业现金持有量与研发强度的相关系数来衡量企业研发的平滑,若该系数显著为负,则表明企业的现金持有存在研发平滑作用,若无关或接近于0,则表明研发平滑不存在。
[2] BROWN J R ,PETERSEN B C .Cash holdings and R&D smoothing[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(3):0-709.
[3] KIM C S,MAUER D C,SHERMAN A E.The Determinants of corporate liquidity:Theory and evidence[J].Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis,1998,33(3):335-359.
[4] STEIN J C.Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources[J].Journal of Finance,2012,52(1):111-133.
[5] PORTA R L,LOPEZ-DE-SILANES F,SHLEIFER A.Corporate ownership around the world[J].The Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[6] Bates T W,Kahle K M,RENé M STULZ.Why do U.S.Firms hold so much more cash than they used to?[J].The Journal of Finance,2009,64(5):1985-2021.
[7]PEDRO S.R&D smoothing:Revisiting the consensus on the cyclicality of research spending [Z].Working paper,2014.
[8] HARFORD J.Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,1999,54(6):1969-1997.
[9] JENSEN M C.Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance,and takeovers[J].American Economic Review,1999,76(2):323-329.
[10]ORR,MILLEr D.A model of the demand for money by firms[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1966,80(3):413-435.
[11] OPLER T,PINKOWITZ L,RENé STULZ,et al.The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings[J].1999,52(1):3-46.
[12] MYERS S C,RAJAN R G.The paradox of liquidity[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(3):733-771.
[13]吴淑娥,仲伟周,卫剑波,等.融资来源、现金持有与研发平滑:来自我国生物医药制造业的经验证据[J].经济学(季刊),2017(2):745-766.
[14] ALMEIDA H,ACHARYA V V,CAMPELLO M.Is cash negative debt?A hedging perspective on corporate financial policies[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2007,16(4):515-554.
[15]SCHROTH E,SZALAY D.Cash breeds success:The role of financing constraints in patent races[J].Warwick Economics Research Paper,2010,14(1):73-118.
[16]王爱群,唐文萍.环境不确定性对财务柔性与企业成长性关系的影响研究[J].中国软科学,2017(3):186-192
[17] DENIS D J,SIBILKOV V.Financial constraints,investment,and the value of cash holdings[J].Review of Financial Studies,2010,23(1):247-269.
[18] KHANNA T,PALEPU K,UNIVERSITY H.The future of business groups in emerging markets:Long-run evidence from chile[J].Academy of Management Journal,2000,43(3):268-285.
[19] KHANNA T.Business groups and risk sharing around the world[J].Journal of Business,2005,78(1):301-340.
[20] HE J,TIAN X.The dark side of analyst coverage:The case of innovation[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2013,109(3):856-878.
[21] HSIEH T J,YEH R S,CHEN Y J.Business group characteristics and affiliated firm innovation:The case of Taiwan[J].Industrial Marketing Management,2010,39(4):560-570.
[22] SHIN H H,PARK Y S.Financing constraints and internal capital markets:Evidence from korean `chaebols’[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2004,5(2):169-191.
[23]JIA N,SHI J,WANG Y.Coinsurance within business group:Evidence from related party transaction in an emerging market [J].Accepted by Management Science,2013,59(10):2295-2313.
[24] GRANT R M.Contemporary strategy analysis:Concepts,techniques,applications with cases set,6th edition[J].Abstract & Applied Analysis,2015,2015:1-1.
[25] DELOOF M.Belgian intragroup relations and the determinants of corporate liquid reserves[J].European Financial Management,2001,7(3):375-392.
[26] BERGER P G,OFEK E.Diversification’s effect on firm value[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1995,37(1):39-65.
[27] MOTTA M,POLO M.Leniency programs and cartel prosecution[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2003,21(3):347-379.
[28]ALMEIDA H,KIM C,KIM B.Internal capital markets in business groups:Evidence from asian financial crisis [J].The Journal of Finance,2015,70(6):2539-2586.
[29]韩亮亮,李凯.控制权、现金流权与资本结构:一项基于我国民营上市公司面板数据的实证分析[J].会计研究,2008(3):66-73.
[30]李增泉,辛显刚,于旭辉.金融发展、债务融资约束与金字塔结构:来自民营企业集团的证据[J].管理世界,2008(1):123-135.
[31] ALMEIDA H V,WOLFENZON D.A theory of pyramidal ownership and family business groups[J].The Journal of Finance,2006,61(6):2637-2680.
[32] BIANCO M,NICODANO G.Pyramidal groups and debt[J].European Economic Review,2006,50(4):937-961.
[33]马忠,陈彦.金字塔结构下最终控制人的盘踞效应与利益协同效应[J].中国软科学,2008(5):91-101.
[34]冯根福,马亚军,姚树洁.中国上市公司担保行为的实证分析[J].中国工业经济.2005(03):13-21.
[35]孟祥展,张俊瑞,程子健.金字塔结构、投资者保护与关联担保:基于控制权和现金流权的分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2015,37(4):11-20.
[36]邵军,刘志远.企业集团内部资本配置的经济后果:来自中国企业集团的证据[J].会计研究,2008(4):47-53.
[37]贺勇,何红渠.民营企业集团、控股股东支持与R&D投资:融资约束情境下的调节作用与中介作用[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2014,35(3):86-98.
[38]BELENZON S,BERKOVITZ T.Innovation in business groups[J].Management Science,2010,56(3):519-535.
[39]刘端,薛静芸,罗勇,等.现金持有、研发投资平滑和产品市场竞争绩效:基于中国高科技行业上市公司的实证[J].系统管理学报,2015,24(5):717-726.
[40] SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W.A survey of corporate governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997,52(2):737-783.
[41]陈希晖.关联交易中终极股东利益输送行为研究:基于“结构-动机(S-M)”两视角的分析[D].南京:东南大学,2015.
[42]杨兴全,曾义.现金持有能够平滑企业的研发投入吗?:基于融资约束与金融发展视角的实证研究[J].科研管理,2014,35(7):107-115.
[43] CHUNG K H,PRUITT S W.A simple approximation of tobin\”s q[J].Financial Management,1994,23(3):70.
[44] BROWN J R,FAZZARI S M,PETERSEN B C.Financing innovation and growth:Cash flow,external equity,and the 1990s R&D boom[J].Journal of Finance,2010,64(1):151-185.
[45]BULUNDELL R,BOND S.GMM Estimation with persistent panel data:An application to production function [J].Econometric Reviews,2009,19(3):321-340.
[46]刘雪松,洪正.金融危机、银行授信与企业流动性管理:中国上市公司的经验证据[J].中国软科学,2017(3):128-144.
[47]温军,冯福根.异质机构、企业性质与自主创新[J].经济研究,2012(3):53-64.
[48]瞿华,刘荣荣.中国城镇化对服务业影响的区域差异:基于系统GMM模型的实证研究[J].重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2018,24(2):15-23.
① 控制权表明终极控股股东对成员企业的重大事项的实际决定权,现金流权则是最终控制人享有成员企业收益分配的权利依据。
(1)Schroth E,Szalay D.“Cash Breeds Success:The role of financing constraints in patent races”,Review of Finance,2010,14(1):73-118.
(2)吴淑娥等2016的研究表明,我国企业中接近1/5的账面资产以现金形式存在。由于普遍存在融资约束、利率波动等环境,企业持有现金成本增加。
(3)共同控制权主要包括股权控制、经营性控制以及家族和血缘关系的协调控制(Khanna and Palepu,2000a),但各国的集团企业形成过程和组织形式大有不同,我国相关法规对企业集团的定义为“以资本为主要纽带,两个或两个以上独立企业,组成具有稳定控制和被控制关系的企业法人联合体”。
(4)金字塔控股结构是指终极控股股东通过持有一系列中介层次公司的股权对底层上市公司实施间接控制的多层级、多链条的控制结构。在这种控制结构中,终极控股股东处于金字塔顶端,由它控制第一层级的公司,然后由第一层级的公司控制第二层级的公司,第二层级的公司再控制第三层级的公司,直到控制底层上市公司,并且终极控股股东对底层上市公司的控制权达到了标准临界值(LaPorta,1999;杨兴君,2003;王鹏,2006)。水平控股结构则与之相对,它指在终极控股股东控制一家公司后,进而在同时控制第二家第三家公司,这些公司都处于终极控股东控制下的同一水平。
(5)La Porta等(1999)判断金字塔结构的条件是:①样本公司存在着终极控股股东;②在控制链条上,样本公司及终极控股股东中间至少存在一个由终极控股股东非完全控制的公司;③终极控股股东对样本公司的控制权必须达到20%以上。
(6)Brown and Petersen(2011)使用企业现金持有量与研发强度的相关系数来衡量企业研发的平滑,若该系数显著为负,则表明企业的现金持有存在研发平滑作用,若无关或接近于0,则表明研发平滑不存在。