混合雇佣模式下的员工激励与协调机制研究——基于企业风险规避视角
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摘要
基于企业风险规避视角,对于混合雇佣模式下的员工激励问题进行了研究,构建了由正式雇佣员工、非正式雇用员工和企业组成的博弈决策模型,分别求解了分散和集中两种决策下的模型,并对集中决策下的模型进行了协调。结果表明,相同激励条件下可以实现两种雇佣员工工作投入相同;协调模式下可以实现个体和整体效用的全面优化,且企业和整体效用与企业风险规避系数负相关,协调机制在企业风险规避系数较大且企业为员工分担较少部分工作成本时较容易被员工接受。
Based on the perspective of enterprise risk aversion, this paper studies the incentive problem of employees in thehybrid employment mode, and constructs a game model which is composed of standard, no-standard employee and the com-pany, solve the decentralized and overall decision-making model, and coordinates the overall decision-making model. Re-sults show that the outcome these two types of employees input the same effort in same incentive condition will be achieved;individual and overall utility's optimization will be achieved; the risk-averse coefficient plays a negative role on company u-tility and overall utility, and the employees will accept the coordination mechanism when the company has a large risk-aversecoefficient and is willing to provide a smaller cost-sharing from the employee's work cost.
Based on the perspective of enterprise risk aversion, this paper studies the incentive problem of employees in thehybrid employment mode, and constructs a game model which is composed of standard, no-standard employee and the com-pany, solve the decentralized and overall decision-making model, and coordinates the overall decision-making model. Re-sults show that the outcome these two types of employees input the same effort in same incentive condition will be achieved;individual and overall utility's optimization will be achieved; the risk-averse coefficient plays a negative role on company u-tility and overall utility, and the employees will accept the coordination mechanism when the company has a large risk-aversecoefficient and is willing to provide a smaller cost-sharing from the employee's work cost.
引文
[1]时博,李新建.非典型雇佣关系实证研究困境及其本土化问题探讨[J].外国经济与管理,2008,30(5):28-34.
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[3]蒋建武,赵珊.劳务派遣员工组织认同动态发展研究:面子和身份的影响[J].管理学报,2014,11(4):541-547.
[4]蒋建武.国内外临时雇佣研究综述与比较———基于SSCI和CSSCI文献的分析[J].中国人力资源开发,2015(21):30-38.
[5]蒋建武,李南才.基于文献计量法的国内临时雇佣研究述评[J].管理学报,2015,12(4):619-624.
[6] Shapiro C, Stiglitz J E. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device[J]. The American Economic Review, 1984, 74(3):433-444.
[7] Akerlof G A. Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1982, 97(4):543-569.
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[9] Campbell C M. A Model of the Determinants of Effort[J]. Economic Modelling, 2006, 23(2):215-237.
[10]雷勇,蒲永健.公平偏好下人力资源组合激励合约机制设计[J].统计与决策,2010(8):51-53.
[11]陆玉梅,高鹏,刘素霞.公平关切及风险规避下知识型员工激励机制及改进模型[J].预测,2016,35(2):56-68.
[12]邓玉林,王文平,达庆利.基于可变风险偏好的知识型员工激励机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2007,21(2):29-33.
[13]邓玉林,王文平.基于人力资本产权的知识型员工激励机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(1):152-156.
[14]陆玉梅,高鹏,刘素霞.企业风险规避下的员工激励模型与协调机制[J].统计与决策,2015(23):177-180.
[15]刘兵,张世英.企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2006(6):51-53.
[16] Appelbaum E, Bailey T, Berg P, et al. Manufacturing Advantage:Why High-performance Work Systems Pay Off[M]. Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 2000.
[17]范冠华,王友江.初次就业派遣员工留任意愿影响因素研究———以京津地区商业银行派遣员工队伍为例[J].管理现代化,2013(2):56-79.
[18]王弘钰.劳务派遣工组织公平结构特征与对策研究[J].社会科学战线,2012(5):267-268.
①hD?=2h1D?。
①UD总?=UED1?+UED2?+UDM? 。
[2]蒋建武,戴万稳.非典型雇佣下的员工———组织关系及其对员工绩效的影响研究[J].管理学报,2012, 9(8):1178-1182.
[3]蒋建武,赵珊.劳务派遣员工组织认同动态发展研究:面子和身份的影响[J].管理学报,2014,11(4):541-547.
[4]蒋建武.国内外临时雇佣研究综述与比较———基于SSCI和CSSCI文献的分析[J].中国人力资源开发,2015(21):30-38.
[5]蒋建武,李南才.基于文献计量法的国内临时雇佣研究述评[J].管理学报,2015,12(4):619-624.
[6] Shapiro C, Stiglitz J E. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device[J]. The American Economic Review, 1984, 74(3):433-444.
[7] Akerlof G A. Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1982, 97(4):543-569.
[8] Akerlof G A, Yellen J L. The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1990, 105(2):255-283.
[9] Campbell C M. A Model of the Determinants of Effort[J]. Economic Modelling, 2006, 23(2):215-237.
[10]雷勇,蒲永健.公平偏好下人力资源组合激励合约机制设计[J].统计与决策,2010(8):51-53.
[11]陆玉梅,高鹏,刘素霞.公平关切及风险规避下知识型员工激励机制及改进模型[J].预测,2016,35(2):56-68.
[12]邓玉林,王文平,达庆利.基于可变风险偏好的知识型员工激励机制研究[J].管理工程学报,2007,21(2):29-33.
[13]邓玉林,王文平.基于人力资本产权的知识型员工激励机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2009,17(1):152-156.
[14]陆玉梅,高鹏,刘素霞.企业风险规避下的员工激励模型与协调机制[J].统计与决策,2015(23):177-180.
[15]刘兵,张世英.企业激励机制设计与代理成本分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2006(6):51-53.
[16] Appelbaum E, Bailey T, Berg P, et al. Manufacturing Advantage:Why High-performance Work Systems Pay Off[M]. Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 2000.
[17]范冠华,王友江.初次就业派遣员工留任意愿影响因素研究———以京津地区商业银行派遣员工队伍为例[J].管理现代化,2013(2):56-79.
[18]王弘钰.劳务派遣工组织公平结构特征与对策研究[J].社会科学战线,2012(5):267-268.
①hD?=2h1D?。
①UD总?=UED1?+UED2?+UDM? 。