退款保证对供应链产品质量和服务的影响
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摘要
在考虑产品价格、质量、服务和提供退款保证的情况下,运用两阶段优化方法分别探究了MS,RS和VN三种供应链模型的均衡质量和服务。研究发现:在不提供退款保证情形下,三种供应链模型的均衡质量和服务一致的,需求、消费者剩余和利润也是一致的;在MS和RS供应链模型中,与不提供退款保证相比,当残值满足一定范围时,退款保证有助于提高服务,在VN供应链模型中,退款保证总是不利于提高服务;与不提供退款保证相比,当残值满足一定范围时,提供退款保证有助于提高质量、需求,消费者剩余和零售商利润,同时降低质量缺陷产品的退货率。
Considering the price,quality,service and money back guarantee,the optimal quality and service of three supply chain models were explored by using two-stage optimization method.The optimal product quality and retail services of MS,RS and VN supply chain models are the same,so are the demand,consumer surplus and profits.When the residual value meets certain conditions in three supply chain models,money back guarantee will help to improve product quality,product demand,as well as consumer surplus,and reduce the rate of product return.When the residual value meets certain conditions,for MS and RS supply chain models,money back guarantee will help to improve retail service.For VN supply chain model,money back guarantee is not conducive to improving services.When the residual value satisfies certain conditions,money back guarantee will help to improve the retailer′s profit and reduce the return rate of quality-defective products in supply chain model.
Considering the price,quality,service and money back guarantee,the optimal quality and service of three supply chain models were explored by using two-stage optimization method.The optimal product quality and retail services of MS,RS and VN supply chain models are the same,so are the demand,consumer surplus and profits.When the residual value meets certain conditions in three supply chain models,money back guarantee will help to improve product quality,product demand,as well as consumer surplus,and reduce the rate of product return.When the residual value meets certain conditions,for MS and RS supply chain models,money back guarantee will help to improve retail service.For VN supply chain model,money back guarantee is not conducive to improving services.When the residual value satisfies certain conditions,money back guarantee will help to improve the retailer′s profit and reduce the return rate of quality-defective products in supply chain model.
引文
[1] 李金镂.消费者“后悔权”的引入——兼评《消费者权益保护法修正案(草案)》第24条之规定[J].商场现代化,2013(20):47-48.
[2] Li X.Coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,179(1):1-16.
[3] 但斌,任连春,张旭梅.质量影响需求下的二级供应链协调模型研究[J].工业工程与管理,2010,15(4):1-4.
[4] 聂佳佳,邓东方.再制造产品质量对闭环供应链回收渠道的影响[J].工业工程与管理,2014,19(1):1-7.
[5] 朱立龙,郭鹏菲,孙淑慧.三种混合分销渠道条件下供应链产品质量控制策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2017(3):85-92.
[6] Ma P,Wang H,Shang J.Supply chain channel strategies with quality and marketing effort-dependent demand[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,144(2):572-581.
[7] Mann D P,Wissink J P.Money-Back Contracts with Double Moral Hazard[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1988,19(2):285-292.
[8] Fruchter G E,Gerstner E.Selling with "Satisfaction Guaranteed"[J].Journal of Service Research,1999,1(4):313-323.
[9] Davis S,Hagerty M,Gerstner E.Return policies and the optimal level of “hassle”[J].Journal of Economics & Business,1998,50(5):445-460.
[10] Moorthy S,Srinivasan K.Signaling Quality with a Money-Back Guarantee:The Role of Transaction Costs[J].Marketing Science,1995,14(4):442-466.
[11] McWilliams B.Money-Back Guarantees:Helping the Low-Quality Retailer[J].Management Science,2012,58(8):1521-1524.
[12] 黄宗盛,聂佳佳,赵映雪.基于消费者满意的双渠道销售商退款保证策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(2):61-68.
[13] Chen B,Chen J.Compete in Price or Service?—A Study of Personalized Pricing and Money Back Guarantees[J].Journal of Retailing,2017,93(2):154-171.
[14] 张国兴,方帅,汪应洛.考虑商品三重竞争的均衡与协调策略研究[J].管理科学学报,2015,18(11):13-24.
[2] Li X.Coordination mechanisms of supply chain systems[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2007,179(1):1-16.
[3] 但斌,任连春,张旭梅.质量影响需求下的二级供应链协调模型研究[J].工业工程与管理,2010,15(4):1-4.
[4] 聂佳佳,邓东方.再制造产品质量对闭环供应链回收渠道的影响[J].工业工程与管理,2014,19(1):1-7.
[5] 朱立龙,郭鹏菲,孙淑慧.三种混合分销渠道条件下供应链产品质量控制策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2017(3):85-92.
[6] Ma P,Wang H,Shang J.Supply chain channel strategies with quality and marketing effort-dependent demand[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2013,144(2):572-581.
[7] Mann D P,Wissink J P.Money-Back Contracts with Double Moral Hazard[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1988,19(2):285-292.
[8] Fruchter G E,Gerstner E.Selling with "Satisfaction Guaranteed"[J].Journal of Service Research,1999,1(4):313-323.
[9] Davis S,Hagerty M,Gerstner E.Return policies and the optimal level of “hassle”[J].Journal of Economics & Business,1998,50(5):445-460.
[10] Moorthy S,Srinivasan K.Signaling Quality with a Money-Back Guarantee:The Role of Transaction Costs[J].Marketing Science,1995,14(4):442-466.
[11] McWilliams B.Money-Back Guarantees:Helping the Low-Quality Retailer[J].Management Science,2012,58(8):1521-1524.
[12] 黄宗盛,聂佳佳,赵映雪.基于消费者满意的双渠道销售商退款保证策略研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(2):61-68.
[13] Chen B,Chen J.Compete in Price or Service?—A Study of Personalized Pricing and Money Back Guarantees[J].Journal of Retailing,2017,93(2):154-171.
[14] 张国兴,方帅,汪应洛.考虑商品三重竞争的均衡与协调策略研究[J].管理科学学报,2015,18(11):13-24.